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Recently the phenomena of external technology exploitation (ETE) has started to attract atten-
tion from scholars, businesses and politicians likewise alongside with a growth of the markets 
for technology. However, the markets for technology are still characterized by inhibiting obsta-
cles that lead to high transaction costs, thus prohibit efficient transactions and result in market 
failure. Although, on the one hand the presence of obstacles lead to high transaction costs, the 
large market potential on the other hand provides incentives for technology market intermedi-
aries (TMI) to develop new exploitation models to facilitate ETE transactions by reducing 
transaction costs. Throughout this paper we address the general research question of whether 
and how new exploitation models can actually facilitate ETE.  
To address this question, in a first step we generate insights into TMIs acting on the markets for 
technology and derived a conceptual basis for a further understanding of TMIs. Having carried 
out a detailed review of the literature, we develop a theory based typology for six TMI arche-
types. Throughout this exercise we gain insights into the variety of different functions TMIs 
have on the markets for technology and various new ways how TMIs try to facilitate ETE 
transactions.  
Throughout the second part of this paper, we focus on IP auctions as one particular business 
model of the archetype ‘IP Broker’. We investigate this ‘young’ business model presenting first 
insights into two qualitative studies. In a first step we derive a generic IP auction process based 
on a qualitative, empirical analysis of IP auction processes. We then translate these results into 
a theory based process view and derive a generic IP auction process as a specific type of an 
ETE process. Having thus generated a close understanding of the transaction process, we pre-
sented results from four cases of successful transactions, i.e. where patents were sold for par-
ticular high prices from two SMEs and two MNCs. The case studies are analyzed according to 
four main aspects including characteristics of the companies that exploited patented technolo-
gies (including motives and selection processes), the patented technology as such, the organiza-






                                                           
1 This paper should be considered work in progress. The content is an extract from Tietze (2009 (forth-
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1  Introduction 
Throughout this paper we address the general research question of whether and how new mod-
els currently offered by TMIs can actually facilitate ETE. To address this question, this paper is 
structured along two parts.  
Throughout the first part we generate insights into TMIs acting on the markets for technology 
and derived a conceptual basis for a further understanding of TMIs. Having carried out a de-
tailed review of the literature, we develop a theory based typology for six TMI archetypes. 
Throughout this exercise we gain insights into the variety of different functions TMIs have on 
the markets for technology and various new ways how TMIs try to facilitate ETE transactions.  
Throughout the second part of this paper, we focus on IP auctions as one particular business 
model of the archetype ‘IP Broker’. We investigate this ‘young’ business model presenting first 
insights into two qualitative studies. In a first step we derive a generic IP auction process based 
on a qualitative, empirical analysis of IP auction processes. We then translate these results into 
a theory based process view and derive a generic IP auction process as a specific type of an 
ETE process. Having thus generated a close understanding of the transaction process, we pre-
sented results from four cases of successful transactions, i.e. where patents were sold for par-
ticular high prices from two SMEs and two MNCs. 
 
2  Growing Markets for Technology 
Markets for technology have existed even at the beginning of the 20
th century (Lam-
oreaux/Sokoloff 1998). However, just recently the phenomena of external technology exploita-
tion (ETE) has started to attract attention from scholars, businesses and politicians likewise. 
This might be due to the recent growth of the markets for technologies in the 1990s, that has 
been observed from various sources, especially in some high-technology areas. Arora, Fosfuri 
et al. (2001) compared estimates at an aggregated level from three different data sources, which 
are subject to numerous caveats but which led to rather consistent results. Limiting their analy-
sis to technological knowledge, their estimates indicated an annual worldwide market for tech-
nology in the range of US$ 35-50 billion in 2000. Elton, Shah et al. (2002) and Kline (2003) 
estimated that the overall US patenting licensing revenues increased from below US$ 15 bil-
lion per year at the beginning of the 1990s to around US$ 100 billion a year in 2002. For the 
period 1994-1996 Gambardella, Giuri et al. (2006) estimated hat the size of the market for the 
EU-8 countries had increased from 9.4 billion euros to 12.7 billion euros from 1997 to 1999, 
and to 15.6 billion euros to 2002. Although still fairly small, the market size had thus grown 
from 0.16%, to 0.20% of GDP which corresponds to a total growth of 65% between the third 
and the first period. Moreover, Gambardella, Giuri et al. (2006) estimated that the potential 
market has grown from 14.8 to 24.4 billions. This market potential suggests that untapped © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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opportunities exist for enhancing the market for patents in Europe and to increase the utiliza-
tion of patents. For Germany as the largest European economy the Institut der deutschen 
Wirtschaft Köln (2006) estimated a potential market size of 8 billion euros. Further results 
from Sheehan, Martinez et al. (2004) indicate that a majority of companies expect an increased 
number of out-licensing deals in the future, while 54% of the respondents has experienced a 
growth of out-licensing in the past since the mid of the 1990s. 
However, aside from the observed growth several scholars, e.g. Lichtenthaler (2006), Arora, 
Fosfuri et al. (2001) indicated that the market was and still is characterized by inhibiting obsta-
cles that lead to high transaction costs, thus prohibit efficient transactions and result in market 
failure. 
2.1  Obstacles to Efficient ETE  
Ford and Ryan (1977, p.370), as one of the pioneers in this research field, provided already 
almost 30 years ago a first attempt of an explanation why ETE opportunities are not realized by 
many companies. “This may be due to the supposed difficulties of handling the marketing of an 
intangible product compared with the tangibility of the normal manufactured product. It may 
also be caused by the difficulties of recognising a potentially marketable technology among 
those possessed (and taken for granted?) by the firm.” Throughout the following years, little 
research was conducted in technology marketing or ETE. Teece (1986, p.303) noted that there 
are particularly “difficulties in pricing an intangible asset” which is not at least due to the 
unique nature of the good.  
Caves, Crookell et al. (1983) analyzing international technology transfer to foreign countries in 
terms of licensing provided an argumentation that the market for technology licenses, like other 
markets for intangible knowledge, is “susceptible to market failures” resulting from five preva-
lent obstacles. At the time when they published their study, they had observed that typically 
only very few companies were willing to license a technology they possess, while on the other 
hand the demand of companies that feel a specific need for a certain technology was limited, 
according to Contractor (1981). These few available ‘pairs’ lead to small-numbers bargaining 
conditions on the market. Additionally, Caves, Crookell et al. (1983) argued that the different 
parties involved in a transaction have asymmetrical access to knowledge about the technology, 
which leads to opportunistic behaviour. Furthermore, since technologies are usually transacted 
that still need certain developments until they can be fully utilized or a technology may not 
work properly at any new location for whatever reason (e.g. missing tacit knowledge) the tech-
nology’s economic performance usually remains uncertain at the time of the transaction. Aside 
from these specific obstacles, Caves, Crookell et al. (1983) argued that the actors involved in 
any transaction usually act risk averse. Since a transfer of a technology usually involves uncer-
tainty whether the technology will perform as promised, a transaction may threaten the partici-
pants due to necessary financial investments. Finally, the preparation and contact costs in-
volved in the transaction can be substantial. Referring to Teece (1977), Caves, Crookell et al. 
(1983) stated that these costs might be between 2% and 59% (average 19%) of the recipient’s © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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total costs for the transfer. Thus transaction costs reduce the attractiveness to engage in any 
transaction additionally.  
When the issue of technology trade received increasing attention by scholars at the end of the 
1990s and early 21
st century, some authors identified and discussed difficulties of technology 
trade in more detail. Throughout their study of technology trade, which was published in their 
influencing work, Arora, Fosfuri et al. (2001) identified various reasons, why markets for tech-
nology are inefficient. Major difficulties include the problems of valuing intangible assets 
without the presence of a market and absence of standard valuation approaches, the context 
dependency of each and every technology, the stickiness of information and the opportunistic 
behaviour of the market actors. As consequence of the presence of these difficulties high trans-
action costs exist for selling technologies that lower the profit opportunities for companies that 
are willing to conduct ETE.  
In addition to the problems identified by Arora, Fosfuri et al. (2001), Lichtenthaler (2004) 
mentioned the OUH (only use here) syndrome that exist in several companies to a certain de-
gree due to political discussions and interests of internal department in context of the resource 
allocation process. On the other end of the ETE process, the companies that should acquire 
technologies often fact the NIH (not invented here) syndrome which reduces the incentives to 
embed a technology into own products or processes that was e.g. invented by a competitor.  
Studying the market for technology, primarily in Japan, Chesbrough (2006, p.146) found that 
there is “no information standard for technology licensing and associated IP trade.” According 
to Chesbrough (2006), this absence of a standard that fails to provide the terms and conditions 
for trading IP because it appears to be difficult to compile statistics on technology trade. With-
out these data, it is hard for companies to know what technology is available in the market and 
for what price ranges. Additionally, it is very challenging to know how to value available tech-
nologies. Chesbrough (2006) lacks a systematic reporting of previous prices paid for external 
technologies. 
Several other studies (e.g. Teece (1998), Teece (2000), Davis and Harrison (2001), 
Gambardella (2002), Chesborough (2003), Cesaroni, Gambardella et al. (2004), Escher (2005)) 
elaborate on certain difficulties for ETE and technology trade. Although, to our knowledge no 
systematic investigation of these problems has been carried out so far, which seems to us es-
sentially when thinking about how to solve these problems. However, this issue is out of the 
focus of our study. Thus, of relevance to us is only the conclusion that “many imperfections 
inherent in the markets for intellectual property resulted in the absence of a well-defined de-
mand and supply”
2 and lead to high transaction costs. These costs are today so high that the 
potential benefits from a monetary external exploitation of technologies is still not high enough 
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for many companies to be an incentive to proactively pursue ETE, even in spite of the large 
potential for technology markets.
3 
The growth of these markets and the large expected potential led to an increasing awareness in 
the business community among patent lawyers from established IP law firms or general coun-
cils from large corporations, who started thinking about how to realize potential business op-
portunities. The huge share of IP assets of the balance sheet from many corporations, further 
justifies that in the future will be room for nowadays emerging business models offered by 
Technology Market Intermediaries (TMIs). Gambardella, Giuri et al. (2006, p.V) further under-
lined that to overcome existing obstacles “standard contracts for technology trade, better means 
for matching technology demand and supply … and … intermediaries in technology trade 
would be typical means for achieving this goal.” 
 
2.2  The Raise of TMIs  
The presence of obstacles on technology markets leading to high transaction costs on the one 
hand but the large market potential on the other hand provides incentives for technology mar-
ket intermediaries (TMI) to develop new exploitation models to facilitate ETE transactions by 
reducing transaction costs. This argumentation links to the theory of Coase (1937). Referring to 
transaction costs, a firm exists if the transaction costs are reduced compared to pure market 
coordination. Accordingly, an intermediary exists if its activities induce a reduction of transac-
tion costs between the market actors, thus enhance the outcome of the market. In recent years 
we have seen a raise of TMIs offering new services attempting to facilitate ETE.  
Throughout a pre-study
4 we identified about 70 TMIs, with the majority being based in the US 
founded until December 2006. Starting from 1980, the number TMIs grew from 4 to 59 in 26 
years. An approximated exponential curve fit indicates an annual growth rate of 8% as illus-
trated in Figure 1. Counting for 80% of the TMIs, US based firms clustered around two centres 
at the west and east coasts. While a considerable number of them are concentrated around and 
in the Silicon Valley at the west coast, another cluster is concentrated at the east cost including 
New York and Massachusetts. The TMIs that are not based in the US are mainly European and 
Canadian firms. In Europe the British and Germans encounter the majority. However, several 
TMIs hold regional offices in Europe, Japan, China and the East Asian Tigers.  
 
                                                           
3 E.g. Chesbrough (2006) reports that some of he found in his study that in the US over “95% of issued 
patents are unlicensed, and over 97% never generate any royalties.” See further e.g. Granstrand, Bohlin et 
al. (1992), Lambe and Spekman (1997), Durrani, Forbes et al. (1999) and Lichtenthaler (2005). 
4 We conducted mainly phone interviews with about 10 inductry experts. A full list will be available in 
Tietze (2009 (forthcoming)). © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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However, as observed as well by e.g. the OECD, BMWI et al. (2005), TMIs
5 have existed 
already in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Patent agents and lawyers played an important role 
in technology markets by matching capital-seeking inventors with investors and by linking 
sellers of technological inventions with potential buyers who had the means to develop and 
commercialise them. Ford and Ryan (1977, p.377) used the term ‘middlemen in technology 
marketing’ for “agents or brokers who bring buyer and seller together but do not take legal title 
to the know-how. Normal fees are 1-3 % of selling price or a percentage of the royalties in-
volved.” However, according to OECD, BMWI et al. (2005) just recently TMIs have become 
more numerous and more diverse as demand for technology transfer and patent valuation have 
grown. As innovation processes have become more open and firms have begun to source more 
of their technology needs from external sources, markets for technology have expanded, and 
with it the role of intermediaries. While in the past TMIs were often legally oriented firms (e.g. 








Figure 1 : Birth and growth of TMIs by year of foundation
6 
The EPO, OECD et al. (2006) drew attention as well to the raise of new business models for 
ETE stating that “the IP marketplace is nowadays in a probe and learn period where the num-
ber of intermediaries is rising.” In this regard, the EPO, OECD et al. (2006) mentioned partner-
ships or technology pools to special purpose investments vehicles, auctions, publicly traded IP 
indexes as well as patent value funds which aim at taking care of IP logistics issues (e.g. find-
ing and negotiating with potential licensees) whilst filling in the financial gap needed to allow 
                                                           
5 The concept of intermediation can be traced back to Stigler (1951), who published a widely recognized 
paper on the division of labour in markets and formed a theoretical basis for intermediation, although not 
explicitly using the terminology.  
6 We do not claim completeness of this sample, since the companies are so widely spread across the globe 
and the majority is small and the young market is currently undergoing large dynamics. However, we 
could probably claim that the sample includes the most important ones and has should cover at least 80-
90% of the firms until December 2006. Further details on the sampling procedure can be found in Tietze 
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the necessary managerial efforts preceding the commercialization of new products, i.e. identi-
fying potential licensors, establishing contacts and negotiating with them up to the closing of a 
deal. According to the EPO, OECD et al. (2006, p.1) these new models “make one step forward 
towards the development of a market for IP transfers …[and]… contribute to the maturation of 
the IP market”. Chesbrough (2006, p.3) found further “anecdotal evidence … that a small 
number of intermediary firms have arisen in recent years to assist in the process of identifica-
tion, negotiation, and transfer of patents from one firm to another.”  
However, aside from few publications, to our knowledge very little systematic research has 
been carried out on this ‘recent’ phenomena. Not at least, this might be due to the difficulties 
that we encountered trying to map the TMIs in our pre-study. So far even no clear definition 
exists that has been widely accepted. Thus, we would like to propose a definition that is based 
on a definition derived from the financial economics on intermediaries in general. According to 
Newman (1992, p.77) intermediaries are defined as:   
“enterprises in the business of buying and selling financial assets…They are not just 
middlemen like dealers and brokers whose main business is to execute transactions for 
clients…[They] do much more than participate in organized markets…[by] adding 
‘markets’ that would not exist without them…[and] do take risks”. 
Based on this definition and on interviews with various industry experts throughout this study
7, 
we propose the following definition for TMIs as:  
“firms specialized in intellectual property that provide services to technology based 
firms to facilitate the external exploitation of intangible assets, predominantly without 
adding value or holding property of the asset, excluding services provided typically by 
patent law firms (e.g. all services related to the patent application procedure)”.  
However, we would like to note that not all scholars have a positive opinion on recent devel-
opment, i.e. the raise of TMIs. Lichtenthaler (2006, p.283) takes a sceptical view on the role of 
intermediaries because “it seems to be difficult to completely rely on the expertise of interme-
diaries in the markets for technology, whose facilitating role in technology transactions (...) has 
to be strongly questioned and whom might rather be used as a complement and not as a substi-
tute of a firm's internal activities.” Following Stigler (1951), Lichtenthaler (2006) argues fur-
ther that it should not be taken for granted that intermediaries will solve all existing problems 
and inefficiencies in the market for technology. In contrast companies might rather develop 
additional in-house competences. Additionally, Harhoff (2007) concluded with a sceptical view 
on current developments on the market for technology questioning the many side effects re-
lated to the strategic behaviour or rather abuse of the system by firms including particular types 
of TMIs (e.g. patent trolls) that are currently observed by the EPO and other governmental 
bodies.  
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How the market for technology will develop and which new ETE models will disappear re-
spectively which will be come widely accepted remains to be seen in the future. This question 
is certainly of relevance but not the focus of our study. We rather accept that nowadays TMIs 
are essential actors on the markets for technology. Because, aside few practitioner papers
8 the 
academic community has not addressed these emerging business models in a systematic and 
sufficient manner. Although we understand that the prevalent dynamic in young markets might 
hinder systematic academic studies due to ever changing contextual factors, in the following 
we analyze and cluster existing, new models that attempt to facilitate ETE.  
 
3  TMIs to Facilitate ETE 
Teece (1981) already observed first signs for an emerging market for know-how although 
Teece (2000, p.112) stated that at the same time “much technology does not enter it … 
[which]… is either because the firm is unwilling to sell or because of difficulties in transacting 
in the market for know-how.” Being aware of the obstacles in ETE that resulted in market 
failure, i.e. transaction difficulties and costs, in recent years various market actors, including 
governments, patent and trademark offices, and firms attempted to develop the markets for 
technology. Focusing on innovation policy Bessant and Rush (1995, p.100) argued that a “pos-
sible element … is the use of consultants as intermediaries to assist and advise firms to com-
pensate for the lack of managerial capabilities” to overcome one of the main barriers to suc-
cessful ‘technology transfer’. Koruna (2001) observed that with new services and instruments 
on the market the process of externally exploiting technologies is getting easier and thus will 
probably also gain more acceptance among companies. Thus, to us it appears realistically to 
assume that intermediaries are important actors in these developments, but at the same time 
little is known about them yet. 
Before we attempt to derive a typology for TMIs, it is necessary to firstly understand how 
TMIs integrate into existing ETE processes. From our perspective, the support of TMIs 
throughout ETE projects influences the transaction process substantially. Thus the former di-
rect ETE process where the seller and buyer interact directly becomes an indirect process with 
TMIs being a third party acting as interfaces between buyers and seller. In the first part of this 
chapter, we discuss this issue more in detail. In the second part of this chapter, we then review 
the literature to gain an understanding of how intermediaries have been clustered throughout 
prior literature. Based on the finding that so far no systematic and sufficient TMI typology 
exists, we then propose a TMI typology in the third part of this chapter.  
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3.1  Indirect ETE 
The perspective of managing the external exploitation
9 of knowledge assets was adopted al-
ready in the 1970s by e.g. (Anderson (1979), Ford and Ryan (1977), Lien (1979), Marcy 
(1979)). Particularly the works of (Ford and Ryan (1977), Ford and Ryan (1981), Ford (1985), 
Ford (1988)) coined the term ‘technology marketing’, a “holistic approach to external knowl-
edge exploitation” and formulated three key elements of technology marketing. He argued that 
technology can be used in the manufacture or design process of a physical product, can be used 
for the marketing of a service based on that technology, e.g., the sale of a design or testing 
service and be used for the sale of a company’s ‘whole’, e.g., the sale of a particular bit of 
electronic know-how to another party for its own use. 
Until the 1990s however the concept was not developed very much further, nor did it receive 
considerable attention by academic scholars besides some very few, e.g. Mittag (1985). 
Granstrand, Bohlin et al. (1992) presented a typology of technology exploitation and acquisi-
tion strategies in context of their analysis of the multi technology corporations. Starting in the 
late 1990s however, the topic received growing attention in context of the growing importance 
of intellectual property in the shift towards the ‘knowledge society’ Granstrand (2000) and the 
open innovation movement Chesbrough (2003) in the early 21
st century. 
In order to provide some details on this topic, we analyzed recent studies drawing on a system-
atic literature review that was presented by Lichtenthaler (2005).
10 Focusing on technology 
exploitation, thus excluding technology acquisition, Lichtenthaler (2005) reported on prior 
research and the development from the early studies in the 1970s until today. Lichtenthaler 
(2005) identified six studies with a ‘noteworthy large enough sample’ to provide reliable re-
sults. However, since the publication of the review by Lichtenthaler (2005) additionally three 
studies were published including the comprehensive study from Lichtenthaler himself (i.e. 
Lichtenthaler (2006)) for which the literature review was a pre-study. The two other studies are 
the ones published by Hentschel (2007) and Escher (2005), although the latter drawing on a 
comparatively small and qualitative empirical basis.  
In addition to the six reviewed studies and the three more recent studies, we think it is worth-
while to add another study from the early 1990s. Because Granstrand and Sjölander (1990) are 
among the pioneers in this research field since they presented the technology base concept 
which includes a first systematization of exploitation strategies, the study conducted by 
Granstrand, Bohlin et al. (1992) among Swedish and Japanese firms should be mentioned, 
aside from the comparatively small sample. Thus, in the following we draw on ten empirical 
                                                           
9 Synonyms used in the literature are basically deployment (e.g. Escher (2005)) and commercialization 
(e.g. by Granstrand (2000), and Lichtenthaler (2006)).  
10 On this topic few reviews exist. Among them some short reviews are embedded in the studies by e.g. 
Escher (2005), Hentschel (2007). © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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studies that were conducted since the mid of the 1980s with a clear focus on ETE solid empiri-







Table 1 : Overview of ten major ETE studies since the mid 1980s 
11 
Drawing on Ford and Ryan (1981), Boyens (1998)
12, and Koruna (2001), from the review of 
the literature Lichtenthaler (2006, p.15) defined external technology commercialization and 
external technology exploitation (ETE) synonymously as:  
“an organization’s deliberate action of commercializing disembodied technological 
knowledge to another legally and economically independent organization involving a 
contractual obligation for compensation in monetary or non-monetary terms.”  
According to Ford (1985) and Boyens (1998) ETE involves inter-organizational technology 
transfer
13, i.e. the transfer of technological knowledge from one legally and economically inde-
pendent organization to another. While the transfer of technologies between different business 
units or functional units of a single company may represent an ETE transaction from the per-
spective of a business unit or functional unit, this type of transaction does not constitute an 
external commercialization of technological knowledge from a corporate perspective.  
Furthermore, the external exploitation of technologies is regarded as a deliberate action of a 
company. Accordingly, it refers to the intended transfer of technologies and thus does not take 
into account the unplanned loss and leakage of information as stated by Granstrand and 
Sjölander (1990) and Boyens (1998).   
Usually the external exploitation of technologies is assumed to include some type of contrac-
tual obligation. While non-formal ways of externally exploiting technologies such as informal 
                                                           
11 This table is based on table 2 in Lichtenthaler (2005) 
12 Boyens (1998) in a non empirical work, had used the following definition: “External exploitation of 
technologies is the planned transfer of technological knowledge from one legally and economically inde-
pendent company to another and it involves a contractual obligation for compensation, either monetary or 
in terms of knowledge transfer. “ 
13 Note: Inter-organisational refers to inter-firm transfer as one of five categories (international, regional, 
cross- industry, inter-firm, and intrafirm) of technology transfer by Khalil (2000, pp. 343-4).  
Authors Sample size Scope of the study
Ford (1985) * N=152 US companies probably in the beginning of the 1980s
Mittag (1985) * N=276 German companies in 1981 (only 98 companies with licensing-out activities)
Vickery (1988) * N=119 Companies worldwide in 1985/86
Granstrand et al. (1992) N=42 Japanese, Swedish and US large corporations
Brodbeck (1999) * N=281 German and Swiss companies in 1996
Elton, Shah et al. (2002) * N>40 (sample unknown)
Birkenmeier (2003) * N=281 German and Swiss firms
Escher (2005) N=29 Interviews plus one workshop
Lichtenthaler (2006) N=155 Survey among 500 largest firms from Germany, plus 100 largest Swiss and Austrian firms each
Hentschel (2007) N=228 Questionnaires and 18 interviews
* Note: These studies have been reviewed by Lichtenthaler (2005)© Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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know-how trading, are important in practice (Hippel (1987), Schrader (1991)), they are nor-
mally initiated by individuals and often do not follow an explicit strategic intention of the com-
pany (Boyens (1998)). As such, these non-formal types of deliberate ETC can hardly be inte-
grated into a company's technology marketing strategy and are, therefore, also excluded from 
further analysis, which again is consistent with earlier works by e.g. Ford (1985). 
A contractual obligation already indicates that a company will usually receive some type of 
compensation for the technology transfer. In the commercialization of products or services, 
according to Koruna (2004) monetary compensation is by far the most common form, whereas 
the commercialization of disembodied knowledge offers various other possibilities, such as bi-
directional technology transfers, which are frequently used in practice. According to Brockhoff, 
Gupta et al. (1991) and Grindley and Teece (1997) examples are cross- licensing agreements or 
the mutual exchange of technologies in alliances. 
Finally, the ETE describe an organization’s deliberate actions of commercializing disembodied 
technological knowledge to another legally and economically independent organization involv-
ing a contractual obligation for compensation in monetary or non-monetary terms as defined by 
Lichtenthaler (2006). Due to the focus on the management tasks of the external exploitation 
mode, the unplanned leakage of technology is mostly excluded in the literature on ETE as done 
by e.g. Ford and Ryan (1981) and Granstrand (2004)). As Lichtenthaler (2006) we follow these 
works and exclude the unplanned commercialization from further analysis. 
Aside from the discussion of the ETE definition provided by Lichtenthaler (2005), in the fol-
lowing we present and discuss ETE definitions applied in the additional three studies by Escher 
(2005), Lichtenthaler (2006) and Hentschel (2007).  
Escher (2005) addressed the two main questions: 1) How can the process organization of ex-
ternal technology deployment and its corresponding organizational structure be tailored? And 
2) How can a technology-based enterprise go about designing and implementing such an exter-
nal deployment organization? From compiling ‘extensive literature’ on technology marketing 
Escher (2005) aimed to develop a holistic technology deployment organization (ETCO) and 
proposed implications for an implementation of such ETCO. However, throughout his study, 
not any definition of the technology deployment concept can be found. However, throughout 
the study, Escher (2005) did not use the ETE concept of Lichtenthaler (2005), but rather ap-
plied the ‘traditional’ terminology following Ford and Ryan (1977). For the technology market-
ing concept Escher (2005, p.24) applied the following definition: “Technology Marketing is a 
process for pursuing normative, strategic and operational enterprise objectives concerning 
technology acquisition and technology deployment markets”. Escher (2005) mentioned that the 
topic technology marketing itself, according to its definition
12, can be divided into the two 
fields: external technology acquisition and external technology deployment (instead of tech-
nology exploitation / commercialization). Escher (2005) perceives licensing and technology-
based spin-offs are subtopics of external technology deployment.  © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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Lichtenthaler (2006) in his study applied of course the definition of ETE that he had proposed 
when he published his literature review as mentioned above. Hentschel (2007) focused on 
specific forms of ETE, particularly on sales of patents and licensing and provides a brief dis-
cussion on the differences between technique and technology. He further elaborated on patent 
law and patent protection as well as that he provides a definition of a patent. However, he did 
not discuss how he integrated this into a more generic concept, nor did he provide any defini-
tion for ETE.  
To summarize the discussion, we can conclude that from the traditional technology marketing 
two concepts developed. Granstrand and Sjölander (1990) developed a framework that includes 
external technology exploitation strategies, which was developed further into the ETC concept 
by Lichtenthaler (2005). Aside from this, Escher (2005) developed the technology deployment 
concept as part of an integrated ETCO. In the following we use the External Technology Ex-
ploitation (ETE) concept referring to the Granstrand and Sjölander (1990) framework because 
it fits well the purpose of our study. However, we do not conduct research in or make use of the 
six different forms of technology exploitation, but rather focus on technology sales (i.e. the 
transfer of ownership) that take place particularly via public auctions.  
 Nowadays, TMIs have started to develop dedicated services trying to reduce transaction costs. 
Thus, as the transaction costs which limit the function of the markets for technology are less 
severe, technology can be sold to downstream firms with relatively small adaptation costs, thus 
benefits of industry wide division of labour. This concept was already discussed by Stigler 
(1951). To our knowledge however, a gap in literature exists that addresses this issue with a 
conceptual framework. So far no framework for ETE indirectly through TMIs was proposed in 
contrast to the direct ETE using internal resources only. We only found some very little concep-
tual work in the literature.  
When Birkenmeier (2003) discussed the differences and similarities of product and technology 
markets, he briefly touched upon this issue. Birkenmeier (2003) proposed to differentiate be-
tween direct and indirect communication and distribution channels for ETE. However, as dis-
tribution Birkenmeier (2003) defined only the tasks that need to be carried out after a contract 
had been signed. According to Birkenmeier (2003) these can be carried out by own organiza-
tional resources (e.g. R&D personal) or via particularly dedicated departments founded solely 
for this purpose or by using intermediaries. Birkenmeier (2003) further proposed to differenti-
ate direct (including personal, written and phone contacts) and indirect communication chan-
nels (including exhibitions, scientific publications and data pools) to address potential custom-
ers. While direct communication bears certain advantages (e.g. control of confidential 
informational to avoid leakage) it has certain disadvantages too (e.g. requires the direct contact 
persons from potential buyers and the risk to concentrate only on known companies within the 
closer context of the own company). Thus, according to Birkenmeier (2003) indirect communi-
cation channels should be favoured if the company lacks adequate knowledge regarding poten-© Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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tial customers and faces difficulties to reduce this information deficit even via a systematic 
search process, or if the company faces financial obstacles.  
Although the differentiation proposed by Birkenmeier (2003) seems rationally, in our under-
standing, that follows the ETE process proposed by Lichtenthaler (2006), the communication 
and distribution tasks are embedded in the planning, respectively realization phase of the ETE 
process. We believe that the ETE process differs whether companies decide to pursue ETE with 
own resources only or whether they outsource at least certain tasks to a TMI. Thus, we propose 
to avoid using separate concepts for ‘distribution’ and ‘communication’ channels, but propose 
the concept of exploitation channels. Companies can directly
14 exploit technologies either us-
ing own resources only or with the help – at least to a certain extent - of intermediaries indi-
rectly. The exploitation then includes all tasks as defined in the exploitation process. To illus-
trate this, we propose an expansion of the Granstrand, Bohlin et al. (1992) framework as can be 










Figure 2 : Extension of the Granstrand, Bohlin et al. (1992) framework with exploitation channels 
In prior research ETE has been discussed primarily as a direct process that takes place between 
a seller and a buyer. Both, the external deployment process by Escher (2005) and the ETC 
process by Lichtenthaler (2004) do not indicate any interfaces with TMIs. However, today 
TMIs play an increasing role in ETE transactions. Following the keep or sell decision, compa-
nies that decide to exploit technologies externally, not only have to chose the proper exploita-
tion strategy for any technology, but as well decide on the distribution channel, i.e. whether 
want to pursue a direct exploitation or rather make use of TMIs to leverage the outcome of the 
ETE transaction. This issue is by far not researched sufficiently, but has to be left to further 
research at this stage since it is out of the scope of our study. In the following we aim to under-
                                                           
14 Czarnitzki, Licht et al. (2001) applied a similar notation and differentiated TMIs that support the ETE 
process directly or induce an indirect ETE process. See further chapter 3.3. 
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stand how TMIs facilitate indirect ETE transactions by offering dedicated services along the 
ETE process. Thus, we continue with a literature review before we then propose a typology to 
categorize TMIs.  
 
3.2  Intermediaries – A Literature Review 
As already mentioned, the intermediary concept emerged from the financial economics and not 
at least from the theory of disintermediation that was proposed Stigler (1951) following his 
paper on the ‘division of labour’. In the following we start with presenting briefly generic func-
tions of intermediaries derived from financial economics by reviewing the results from 
Sauermann (2000). We then focus more narrowly on innovation processes and systems review-
ing the results from Bessant and Rush (1995) and Howells (2006). Then we focus further on 
the functions of intermediaries involved in technology transactions reviewing three valuable 
studies
15 out of the scarce literature including Lien (1979), Czarnitzki, Licht et al. (2001), and 
Krattiger (2004). 
Sauermann (2000) distinguished intermediaries according to their function and proposed four 
types of main functions, thus four generic types of intermediaries as commonly found in finan-
cial markets. According to Sauermann (2000), intermediaries can serve to develop organized 
markets and transaction systems (e.g. stock exchanges). He argued that on highly organized 
markets the share of variable transaction costs are usually lower than on markets with a lower 
organizational degree. However, a higher organizational degree itself causes additional costs, 
mainly fixed costs. Not at least the characteristics of the traded asset (e.g. degree of standardi-
zation, divisibility) as well as the market actors (e.g. the number of actors on the market and 
their professionalism and transaction frequency) determine the optimal degree as a trade-off 
between fixed and variable costs. Closely related to this issue is the configuration of a man-
agement system to administer these markets properly. Not until such a system for regulating 
credits and debits on accounts is established, a market can be enable decisions without prohibi-
tive transaction costs via high information efficiency. Following this thought, intermediaries 
can act to integrate geographically disconnected markets. Efficiency gains results on the one 
hand from a lower degree of fixed organizational costs and on the other hand the higher degree 
of informational transparency and economics of scale and diversification. As a second function 
Sauermann (2000) defined the monitoring function as carried out by e.g. rating and news agen-
cies. Economic transactions are usually associated with risk and uncertainty. However, an in-
vestor needs to assess and monitor the risk if she aims for a risk adjusted rent and wants to 
insure herself against negative incentives resulting from information asymmetry (monitoring 
costs). Referring to Eichberger and Harper (1997), Sauermann (2000) argues further that these 
                                                           
15 Further typologies can be found in Mittag (1985) and Fu and Perkins (1995). However, they merely 
overlap with the typologies presented in this paper, thus are not repeated here.  © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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costs can be extremely high especially for small investors due to the risk of partial market 
failure. Thus, intermediaries may specialize in the continuous monitoring of risks and opportu-
nities. They might be able carry out these activities for significant lower costs by realizing 
economies of scale and learning effects. As a third function, intermediaries may carry out 
‘transformational functions’ (e.g. as broker, investment banks). Banks, as an example for this 
function, may serve their clients to shift funds that are accounted for in the financial statement 
with certain properties into funds with other properties. E.g. Fabozzi, Modigliani et al. (1994) 
argues that debts might be activated so they can be accounted as own liabilities, particularly 
related to batch size, risk and terms. According to Sauermann (2000), as fourth function inter-
mediaries may integrate the abovementioned activities (e.g. investment banks, insurance com-
panies) and offer a full service bundle to reduce the total costs. Intermediaries might integrate 
in order to avoid reduplication and incentives to produce higher quality through internalizing 
certain defects to create a stronger bargaining position against capital seeker.   
In context of innovation processes and innovation systems, different roles of intermediaries 
were described in prior literature. Various authors however used different synonyms (e.g. third 
parties Mantel and Rosegger (1987), intermediary firms Stankiewicz (1995), bridgers Bessant 
and Rush (1995), superstructure organizations Lynn, Reddy et al. (1996), brokers Hargadon 
and Sutton (1997), McEvily and Zaheer (1999), Provan and Human (1999), and information 
intermediaries Popp (2000)). We do not review all these studies, but present results from 
Bessant and Rush (1995) and Howells (2006), two particularly interesting papers. Although 
focusing only on one particularly intermediary type Bessant and Rush (1995) conducted an 
analysis “examining the literature on innovation and transfer” and of some specific cases that 
led to the identification of five dimensions that can be used for typologizing intermediaries. 
Howells (2006) proposal of a typology of innovation intermediaries is based on a literature 
review and case studies in the UK. 
Bessant and Rush (1995) provided insights specifically in the role of consultants as a particular 
type of intermediaries with a variety of sub-types. Based on the elaboration of the characteris-
tics of the technology transfer process
16, Bessant and Rush (1995) proposed, although not made 
transparent based on which systematic approach, needs for clients in the technology transfer 
processes where ‘consultants’ provide support. Furthermore, Bessant and Rush (1995) provide 
an overview of bridging activities that consultants might fulfil.  
                                                           
16 According to Bessant and Rush (1995, p.98), consultants support the “multi-dimensional character of 
technology transfer” processes, which he defined “as non-linear, and characterised by multiple interac-
tions, systems integration and complex networks.” Thus, according to Bessant and Rush (1995, p.98) 
technology transfer is not an “instantaneous event but a time-based process involving several stages… 
[being a]…complex activity involving multiple actors”. These transactions may not always take place on 
the “basis of one-to-one but may also be one to many or many to many”. Furthermore, transactions “may 
not proceed directly but may often operate through various forms of intermediary.” © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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According to Bessant and Rush (1995), consultants support clients for a variety of generic 
purposes. To build up certain capabilities, consultants can advice and inform clients to enable 
the development of key management capabilities in identifying needs, exploring and selecting 
innovations, planning, implementation and project management. For ‘institution building’ these 
schemes also offer an opportunity for developing strategic capabilities across the supply side - 
for example, mobilising a critical mass of technological knowledge and skills in support of 
particular technologies. Consultancy services can further help to avoid failures. Providing tar-
geted advice and direct technical and managerial support offered opportunities to reduce the 
incidence of costly failures of investments through transferring better innovation management 
practice - for example in selecting appropriate applications of new technology and in project 
management. Consultants can provide innovation support through information and advisory 
service less expensive than their clients can do internally. Using consultants as intermediaries 
opens up the possibility of reaching user firms more directly than traditional financial support 
mechanisms which tended to lack focus and often failed to reach many potential users within a 
target group. Using consultants can enable a more decentralised mode of operation, involving 
less monitoring and control. Once the broad objectives of a programme were set out it could be 
largely self-managing, with overall monitoring and quality assurance provided by a small and 
specialist group, itself sometimes outside of government but contracted with the specific pro-
ject monitoring role. 
Bessant and Rush (1995) then provided an overview of specific functions of consultants link-
ing these to the identified needs. Consultants support clients that feel a need for support to 
articulate demand for specific technologies and throughout the selection of appropriate options. 
Furthermore, consultants support clients in the identification of needs, the selection as well as 
the training and development of skills and human resources. Consultants further deliver finan-
cial support to make a business case serving as financial sources (e.g. venture capital funds). 
Consultants further support clients in the identification and development of business and inno-
vation strategies. Using examples of best practice consultants these can further provide educa-
tion and serve as linker to external knowledge systems, e.g. identification of knowledge 
sources regarding new knowledge for emerging technologies. Consultants finally serve as spe-
cialist resources and provide project management throughout the implementation of external 
sources e.g. new technologies.  
Drawing on the analysis, Bessant and Rush (1995) identified five dimensions that can be used 
for creating an ‘indicative typology’ of consultants. Firstly, consultants can offer services rang-
ing from expert to process or secondly from sector specific to general. Thirdly, consultancy 
firms can be small ‘one man shows’ or large, multidisciplinary firms. Fourthly, they can apply 
specific technologies (e.g. total quality) or rather be generalists. Finally, their background can 
be rather traditionally or linked to fairly new phenomena (e.g. information technology).  
From a review and synthesis of the literature Howells (2006) developed a typology and frame-
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operationalized the typology within the context of the UK. Howells (2006) conducted a set of 
case studies in the UK that involved semi-structured interviews with managers in 22 organiza-
tions (plus eight subsidiary companies), based on specific project collaborations, together with 
overall strategies and work practices. Throughout the case studies, Howells (2006, p.720) ap-
plied the following definition for an innovation intermediary:  
“An organization or body that acts an agent or broker in any aspect of the innovation proc-
ess between two or more parties. Such intermediary activities include: helping to provide 
information about potential collaborators; brokering a transaction between two or more 
parties; acting as a mediator, or go-between, bodies or organizations that are already col-
laborating; and helping find advice, funding and support for the innovation outcomes of 
such collaborations.” 
When Howells (2006) conducted the case studies based on the above definition and the under-
standing of innovation intermediaries he had gained from the literature review, Howells (2006) 
however was surprised to find “considerably more functions than originally conceived.” From 
his work he identified ten functions that included “new unrecognised or undervalued roles”. 
These ten functions of intermediaries as identified by Howells (2006) are: (1) Foresight and 
diagnostics, (2) scanning and information processing, (3) knowledge processing and combina-
tion/recombination, (4) gate keeping and brokering, (5) testing and validation,  (6) accredita-
tion, (7) validation and regulation, (8) protecting the results, (9) commercialisation, and (109 
evaluation of outcomes. 
Having identified possible functions of intermediaries as financial institutions and reviewed the 
role that intermediaries play in innovation processes and systems, we continue discussing spe-
cific functions of intermediaries for technology transfer.  
Lien (1979) defined four functions of the “middleman” in the technology transfer process as 
follows. Intermediaries can determine specific opportunities in terms of specific needs - i.e. to 
be guided primarily by market “pull” rather than “technology push”. Differently from tradi-
tional shopping, where the buyer chooses goods among the ones available on the shelf, inter-
mediated transactions involve a detailed description of the clients needs. The need represents a 
client oriented transaction. Besides working as salesperson, when the client has a technology 
offer, the intermediate shall perform the procurement task for any identified need. As a second 
function Lien (1979) proposed, that intermediaries help to identify appropriate sources of tech-
nical breakthroughs, scientific information, and other technological developments that will 
meet identified needs. Once clients’ needs are identified, the intermediary can make use of 
particular expertise and networking resources to address such needs; thus following an active 
approach instead of a passive one. Furthermore, according to Lien (1979), intermediaries build 
bridges between the sources and the users. When two parties of the transaction are identified, 
the middleman links them through proper presentation, and explanation of how beneficial such 
transaction can be for both ends. Finally, beyond “building bridges”, intermediaries encourage 
appropriate linking mechanisms and provide other services, skills, and inputs to accelerate © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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sound commercialization. In addition to the tasks of an agent or broker, intermediaries work as 
catalyst for transactions, providing specialized expertise of intellectual property in the form of 
supporting services. 
Although their study primarily focused on university technology transfer in contrast to inter 
firm transfers, Czarnitzki, Licht et al. (2001) provided one of the few valuable typolologies of 
intermediaries involved in technology transactions. Czarnitzki, Licht et al. (2001) differentiated 
between direct and indirect transactions. Certain intermediaries support transactions directly. 
These include consulting and the research of certain information as well as providing training 
services to companies to build up own competences. Additionally, Czarnitzki, Licht et al. 
(2001) identified intermediaries that conduct own R&D and thus add value to a certain tech-
nology. According to Czarnitzki, Licht et al. (2001), these intermediaries participate in the 
direct transfer. Intermediaries that support transactions rather indirectly offer services related to 
the bridging of the supply and demand side, e.g. by providing commercial exploitation of R&D 
results, services for patent analysis and technology scouting.  
Noteworthy to us seem further that based on their analysis of problems in technology transac-
tions, Czarnitzki, Licht et al. (2001) were among the very few who proposed ‘points of depar-
ture’ for intermediaries, i.e. functions how these can help to develop the market for technology, 
although primarily focusing on university technology transfer. Although their model is neither 
exhaustive Czarnitzki, Licht et al. (2001) nor very detailed and free of overlaps, it is however 
one of the very few and should be mentioned. According to Czarnitzki, Licht et al. (2001), in 
order to solve information asymmetries, intermediaries can provide platforms for technology 
owner to market their technologies, e.g. in the internet or on exhibitions. Intermediaries can 
further consult potential buyers regarding technologies offered on the market and monitor im-
portant trends and the demand for certain technologies. To overcome problems related to high 
costs for interested companies willing to acquire a technology intermediaries can act to bridge 
supply and demand, can carry out certain searches and prepare reports (e.g. due diligence) and 
offer possibilities for directly contacting companies (e.g. seminars, workshops, fairs). To re-
duce high transaction costs, intermediaries may offer consulting regarding contract design and 
project management. To reduce uncertainty regarding externalities intermediaries may facilitate 
the development of trust between the various actors, carry out ‘specific’ tasks throughout a 
transaction and offer financial support when spinning off companies. Regarding the reduced 
transfer possibility, intermediaries may offer training course, create incentives, offer consul-
tancy in innovation management and support the development of R&D labs.  
In addition, Birkenmeier (2003), as one scholar having conducted research particularly on 
ETE, identified four main functions that intermediaries support.
17 Intermediaries can provide 
                                                           
17 Birkenmeier (2003) does not provide a detailed explanation of how he developed this typology; neither 
does he provide any detailed explanations of these functions but the typology seemed noteworthy to us 
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information services regarding technological applications, market data, industries, companies 
and competitors, regarding existing technological knowledge as well as certain funding 
sources. Secondly, intermediaries consult companies regarding their innovation and technology 
management. Thirdly, intermediaries may support companies regarding patent applications, 
licensing contracts, entrepreneurship and human resource development. Finally, intermediaries 
support companies in their project management.  
Aside from the very few systematic attempts to develop a typology some few other publica-
tions exist that rather provide lists of various intermediary types. In the following we just like 
to mention a few to illustrate the variety of existing intermediaries which illustrate as well the 
early stage of the market development. In this growth phase, new models are currently still 
emerging which have to stand up to the competition. Later on we might expect a consolidation 
phase in the market which might lead to a disappearance of some of these.  
Krattiger (2004) provided a list with specific intermediaries without discussing their functions 
only providing some characteristics of each intermediary group. According to Krattiger (2004) 
intermediaries serve as royalty collection agencies, as various forms of clearing house (infor-
mation, technology, open-source innovation), act as brokers and other types of facilitators, and 
provide IP management services (law firms and consultants). Furthermore, intermediaries can 
act as IP commercialization agents, merchant banks, or develop patent pools. From a practitio-
ner point of view Millien and Laurie (2007) provided another collection of various intermedi-
ary types. These include patent licensing and enforcement companies, institutional patent ag-
gregators/ IP acquisition funds, IP/technology development companies, licensing agents, 
litigation finance/investment firms, patent brokers, IP-based M&A advisory, IP auction houses, 
online IP/technology exchanges/clearinghouses, IP-backed financiers, royalty stream securiti-
zation firms, patent rating software and services, university technology transfer intermediaries, 
as well as some recently ‘emerging business models’ that include IP transaction ex-
changes/trading platforms, defensive patent pools, technology/IP spinout financing, and patent-
based public stock indexes. 
Although we have seen that typologies exist for intermediaries in financial markets, for innova-
tion systems and partially for technology transfers involving universities, we can conclude that 
so far no systematic typology exists that can be used to classify intermediaries specifically for 
ETE between firms, i.e. technology market intermediaries (TMIs). Having reviewed the litera-
ture as presented above, in the following we attempt to develop such a qualitative and consis-
tent typology for TMIs that includes ‘typical’ or ‘classical’ business models, e.g. services that 
were available when Lien (1979) proposed a typology, as well as more recent ones.  
 
3.3  A Typology for TMIs 
To derive a typology for technology market intermediaries (TMIs) we applied a three step 
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known throughout Europe and the US as a leading country for technology trade. Secondly, we 
analyzed the business models that we identified applying the ‘nine business model building 
blocks’ from Osterwalder (2004) in order to identify similar groups that can be clustered. The 
model proposed by Osterwalder (2004) was used to analyze four ‘main pillars’ in the compa-
nies characteristics: their products, the customer interfaces, the infrastructure management and 
certain financial aspects. The first, concerns the firm’s value proposition, meaning the range of 
products and services that create value for the companies’ customers. The second pillar de-
scribes the interface between the firm and its customers, identifying who are the clients, which 
channels are used to reach them and how the relationship with them is characterized. The infra-
structure pillar describes the activities, resources and competencies which enable the business 
case and the last pillar, financial aspects, depicts the firm’s cash in and out flows. In a third step 
we analyzed the groups of similar types using the ‘business model archetype’ framework by 
Herman and Malone (2003) to develop a generic typology for TMIs that finally includes six 
different meta types of TMIs.  
Applying the ‘nine business model building blocks’ from Osterwalder (2004), among the 70 
TMIs we identified 12 different groups within TMIs have similar characteristics regarding the 
four pillars. These 12 groups are presented in the following and include Licensing Agents, IP 
Brokers, IP Auctions, Online IP Market exchanges, IP-Backed Financing, IP Consulting, IP 
Outsourcing Services, Funded IP Aggregator, Litigation Finance Fund, Technology Transfer, IP 
Investment Banks, IP Development.  
Licensing agents can be regarded as the most traditional type of TMI. Licensing agents are 
typically middlemen with the core competences being networking with expertise in the licens-
ing process that requires legal know-how and a wide contact network. Their target customers 
can be either general or dedicated to a specific field, such as the semiconductor industry. 
Mostly a close relationship exists with clients with its duration depending on the revenue 
model. Such companies generate revenues either in a single fixed or success fee instalment or 
as a percentage of running royalties streams. Licensing agents usually act in the middle of the 
ETE process, during the marketing, networking and transaction phases. Their activities include 
the identification of potential partners for clients, packaging and the preparation of IP bundles, 
IP presentation, approaching other party, contacting other intermediaries, due diligence, and 
negotiations. Eventually the payment is performed through the IP firm. Clients may be either IP 
owners or licensees. Main cost drivers of licensing agents are expenses for own employees. 
These firms are usually small and ran by their principals. The lack of infrastructure found in 
large corporations is compensated by these firms with reduced operational costs. Transactions 
are preferably carried out via private sale engagements. An important distinction within the 
licensing business is the approach for the patent monetization. The first alternative is based on 
assertion, when companies push patent licenses to others using the threat of court litigation as 
selling proposition. Such approach leads to a rather ‘hostile’ relationship between licensors and 
licensees, sometimes observed in recent years e.g. in the electronics and internet industries. 
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lish and ensure freedom to operate and avoid infringement cases. This type of transaction can 
be referred as ‘assertion approach’. The second approach for licensing is what IP professionals 
traditionally associate with technology transfer, which is typically employed in the health care 
and pharmaceutical industries. In this case the patent owners seek licensing contracts as a 
means to take a technology to the market. There is no anticipation of litigation and the value is 
determined by the potential for future revenues. This type of transaction can be referred as 
‘business opportunity approach’, and is closely related to patent brokering.  
IP brokers and licensing agents are often subject of confusion, due to the close relationship 
between these two models and the fact that TMIs employ both simultaneously. The basic dis-
tinction between brokering and licensing is the ownership of the asset. Whereas licensing 
agents trade the right to the use of the asset, the broker sells the asset itself. One should note 
however that an exclusive licensing agreement can have a similar legal effect than the sale of a 
patent. While brokering is related to the technology transfer approach of licensing, it is hardly 
associated to assertion. Another difference between brokering and licensing is the relationship 
of the IP firms with their clients. While licensing agents might take a percentage of the running 
royalty payments and keep a long term relationship with their clients, brokers typically termi-
nate the contractual relationship to the client after a transaction. Similarly to licensing agents, 
brokers act in the middle of the ETE process, during the marketing, networking and transaction 
phases. Their cost drivers are similar. Although the main trade channel of brokers is private 
sale engagement, they occasionally promote private auctions to leverage the price of the IP.  
IP auctions relate to brokers in value proposition and target customers, but differ in terms of 
the trade channel, and core competences. The IP auction business model is characterized by the 
public offers of patent licensing or the asset as such, i.e. the patent, either live (a) or online (b). 
Differently from online patent exchange platforms, which only provide listing of needs and 
offers, IP auctions actually perform transactions. By conducting transactions in a pre-
determined date, auctions provide a tool for companies e.g. willing to exploit their intellectual 
property quickly, for companies in financial difficulties or for selling of IP assets of bankrupt 
companies. Additionally, patent owners with reduced budgets for advertisement and network-
ing can benefit from the infrastructure offered by IP auctions. While providing a fast and often 
effective solution, auctions have a significant disadvantage. In absence of many bidders patent 
owners might artificially reduce the market price of their assets. The auction’s cost drivers 
include expenses related to marketing, human resources, IT infrastructure for online data 
rooms, and the actual event. Similarly to brokers, the compensation for the auction company 
might be through success and/or fixed fee.  
The business model of online IP exchanges (market places) is characterized by the establish-
ment of a platform for promotion of patent demand and supply. They are often called ‘ex-
changes’, although there are actually no transactions occurring through the websites. The fun-
damental model of an online exchange is based on a value configuration which includes 
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model with brokering, consulting and outsourcing services. Online marketplaces share some 
characteristics with online auctions, such as trade channel and cost structure. The main differ-
ence between the two models is the extent of engagement throughout any transaction. The first 
simply lists the technology, with information such as price and terms delivered only after re-
quest. The latter explicitly manages transactions, with open price bidding. The revenue model 
of online exchanges is either based on fix membership and/or success fees. The first occurs 
when technology based enterprises pay to list their technology in the website. The latter is 
realized if the buyer and seller successfully complete a transaction. Differently from broker and 
agent models, the relationship with clients is performed remotely with reduced direct interac-
tion.  
IP-backed financing is a business model characterized by the use of IP to raise capital. These 
TMIs combine financial and IP expertise to provide IP owners the opportunity to raise capital 
without having to give away any IP or equity stake. The incentives include not only monetary 
but also accounting and tax benefits. Innovative IP-backed financial transactions are likely to 
undergo many changes until the market reach maturity. Each type of transaction could become 
a business model itself. Some examples include securitization of future royalty revenue 
streams, patent sale license-back (off-balance sheet loan), and collateralization (IP-backed 
debt). The IP-backed financing firm acts as a ‘general’ broker, linking the patent owner to the 
financing institution. The core competences which enable such transactions are financial and IP 
expertise, as well as good networking in both of those fields. Analytics, like patent valuation 
and market analysis, might be outsourced to specialized firms.  
TMIs offering IP consulting services deal directly with a technology based firm without any 
patent transaction. The usual number of involved parties is therefore limited to the client and 
the TMI. Such models are often used in combination with others in order to profit from the 
TMIs knowledge in the field. IP consulting is a particular application of this business model. It 
is characterized by the sale of expertise from a specialized IP firm to a technology based enter-
prise. The client typically owns a portfolio of patents and seeks support of specialists for analy-
sis, management, and commercialization of their intellectual property. Traditional applications 
of such model include legal and IP strategy advising. IP consultants usually deal directly with 
their clients, providing support along the whole ETE process. Often the IP consultant appoints 
other IP firms to handle supporting services and commercialization. The cost drivers are basi-
cally expenses with human resources. Means for revenues are usually either a fixed fee our 
accounted hourly. 
IP outsourcing firms, similarly to consulting firms, provide services to technology based firms 
that seek management and monetization of patent portfolios. The major difference between 
these two models is the value proposition and configuration. While consultants sell only ad-
vice, outsourcing firms handle directly services that clients are unable or uninterested to per-
form themselves. Typically outsourced services include patent and portfolio valuation, contract 
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for their clients, where the IP owner simply develops the technology without any effort for 
either defensive, offensive use of the patents. Besides the value proposition and the configura-
tion, IP consulting and outsourcing firms share similar characteristics. However, the latter 
might bear higher cost due to expenses in research and development of the tools (e.g. software) 
provided to their clients.  
Funded IP aggregators employ a business model that is characterized by the acquisition of 
patents to build own IP portfolios, usually mainly consisting of patents. A portfolio can either 
be focused in a single technological field or encompass a wide range of technologies. Often 
these companies claim to profit from the development of a technology, however companies 
possessing patents in the same field of the aggregator’s portfolio sometimes fear aggressive 
assertion ‘attacts’. Aggregators might not directly acquire IP, but perform their acquisitions 
through brokers, auctions or private sales engagement. The revenue model is based on invest-
ments from other companies, commercialization or litigation. The investments might be moti-
vated either by the assertion or the business opportunity approach. In the first case, technology 
based firms invest in a fund to acquire IP related to their activities in a defensive strategy. The 
funds offer protection from possible future litigation, seeking control of most of the patents 
related to a sensitive technology. In the second case investors are keen on the future potential 
of certain IPs and rely on the confidence that a strong portfolio is more valuable than the indi-
vidual IPs separately. Funded IP aggregators usually raise money for IP acquisitions from other 
investors. A sophisticated set of valuation tools and networking expertise are indispensable 
competences for the proper spending of these investments. Those competences are also valu-
able when selling or licensing IP.  
Differently from funded IP aggregators, litigation finance funds are not committed to the 
acquisition of patents. This business model is rather characterised by the union of investors that 
sponsor costly litigation suits in return of a share of the results. The litigation finance funds 
may deal on one side with TBFs facing thorough litigation suits. Such companies can refer to 
funds either when facing financial difficulties caused by legal costs or as resource to share the 
incurred risks. They can be either the infringer or the proprietor. On the other side litigation 
finance funds may deal with ‘opportunistic’ investors without any interest in a particular IP as 
such, if they gain an appropriate return on their investments only when a case is won or a set-
tlement is achieved. In case of a settlement, a licensing agreement is imposed to the infringer 
and the investors receive their share of the royalty revenue streams. Litigation finance funds 
rely particularly on legal and technical expertise to understand the probability of a success of a 
litigation case.  
TMIs offering technology transfer service combine patent brokering, licensing and a set of 
supporting services to fully relocate the technology from one institution to another. This model 
can be often found to transfer technologies from universities and research institutes to compa-
nies. The transaction includes not only patents rights but often also knowledge, technological © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
 
27 
know-how and eventually tangible assets. Another type of technology transfer occurs between 
two companies, when even employees, laboratories and production facilities are relocated.  
The business model of IP investment banks combines consulting, licensing, brokering, and 
financial services. The model’s value proposition is to facilitate strategic and financial corpo-
rate operations involving IP. These TMIs usually adopt the business opportunity approach to 
enable the IP exploitation for their clients. The value configuration of IP investment banks 
involve composite transactions, which include licensing, patent sale, mergers and acquisitions, 
joint ventures, spin-offs, and IP-backed financing. Their clients are TBFs seeking strategic use 
of their IP. Companies sometimes spin off non-core IP into a new firm to manage a particular 
technology as a core business. In a case where there is already a market player in the referred 
area, both companies might share the equity of the spin-off. The first contributes with the IP 
and the second develops and takes it to the market. In order to tailor such complex transactions 
IP investment bank have to combine financial and IP expertise with a wide contact network. 
Their revenue model is similar to brokers and licensing agents, i.e. might be a fixed and/or 
success or participation on the running payments of licensing agreements. The cost drivers are 
mainly human resources. Analytic services like IP valuation may be outsourced. 
Finally, IP development firms carry out activities that aim to increase the value of patents 
trying to realize synergy effects through the combining of complementing, but previously inde-
pendent patents or by performing own R&D to further develop a technology. Once a technol-
ogy reaches a mature level, the IP development firms negotiate licensing agreements with 
technology based firms to take the technology to the market. The IP development firms differ 
from outsourced technology developers by the value configuration and revenue model. While 
the first develops IP without necessarily having a pre-defined client, the latter is hired to fulfil a 
specific technology need of a company. Furthermore, the business model of IP development 
firms is typically associated with patent aggregation. These firms rely on technical and IP ex-
pertise to identify and acquire patents with high market potential from various sources, includ-
ing universities, research institutes, inventors, and TBFs.  
Because the market for technology is still immature and emerging, in the future we will see 
some of the existing business models surviving, some disappearing and new ones emerging. 
Thus, having identified and presented the above mentioned business models that are currently 
existing, in a next step we applied the framework for ‘business models archetypes’ of Herman 
and Malone (2003) to develop a sustainable typology on a higher level of abstraction that is 
suitable to include existing as well new business models. Herman and Malone (2003) defined 
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of ‘what the business model does’ while the second dimension addresses the question of ‘how 
the business makes money from its activities’.
18  
The first dimension labelled ‘degree of transformation’ relates to the level an asset is trans-
formed with the support of a firm and distinguish three cases. Certain companies do not add 
any value to an asset, e.g. by only linking a seller to a buyer. Other companies conduct own 
R&D, e.g. construct prototypes of a technology, thus add a significant value to the traded asset. 
The third case rather distinguishes the extent of the transformation between high and low. 
The second dimension labelled ‘nature of the service’ relates to the type of service that is sold. 
Herman and Malone (2003) distinguish four cases. Certain firms operate by obtaining owner-
ship of assets, then perform certain activities and pass on the ownership to other entities. Other 
firms only make use of an asset without obtaining its ownership. Furthermore, other firms 
operate their business making use of only human resources, i.e. the knowledge and experience 
of their employees, without any close relation to a traded asset. Finally, certain firms provide 
solutions/platforms to clients which these use attract attention by other firms. These firms do 
not generate any revenues that are related to the asset but only from additional services related 
to the solution provided. 
Along these two dimensions Herman and Malone (2003) defined six generic ‘archetypes’, 
although these are often combined by firms. However, having carried out an analysis of 500 
firms (including over 450 of the Fortune 500) Herman and Malone (2003, p.19) came to the 
conclusion that “these [six] models can be used to classify all the different combinations that 
exist.” According to Herman and Malone (2003), a company employs the creator model
19 if it 
acquires the ownership of assets (e.g. raw materials or components) from other firms and trans-
forms them to a high degree (e.g. by assembling the components) in order to create a product 
or a service. The product or service may be physical, informational or financial (e.g. an insur-
ance policy). A company employing the distributor model acquires ownership of assets and 
resells the product to another party, but transforms these only to a limited degree, e.g. by re-
packaging the product or providing customer service. A broker facilitates sales by matching 
buyers and sellers and also provides advice to either or both parties. Unlike a distributor, a 
broker does not take ownership of any asset being sold. A broker usually receives a fee from 
the buyer, the seller, or both often in the form of a commission based on a percentage of the 
sale price or the volume. A landlord does not sell, respectively resell the ownership of any 
asset but rather sells the right to make use of an asset. In this case the assets are commonly 
locations (e.g., a hotel room, apartment, or amusement park), events (e.g., a concert), or 
                                                           
18 Please note, that for detailed analysis of business models Herman and Malone (2003) suggested a more 
detailed list that defines sub-items of the major business activities (i.e. buy, make, sell, design, and man-
age). Details on this issue can be found in their paper. 
19 Note that due to the legal character of licening agreements, in this analysis we considered the transfer 
of licenses as the transfer of (at least part of the) ownership, instead of pure use of the asset. © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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equipments (e.g., a rental car or recording studio). Depending on the kind of asset, the pay-
ments may be called ‘rent’, ‘lease’, ‘admission’ or similar terms. For selling the use of an asset, 
a landlord can transform the asset to a high or low degree. A Contractor usually provides 
services (e.g. consulting) for specific assets. Most services involve a combination of both hu-
man and non-human resources. If the service being sold involves more non-human resources 
the business model is classified as a Landlord rather than a Contractor. Payments are usually 
made in the form of a fee for service, often based on the amount of time the service requires. 
An Attractor attracts human attention for an asset by providing solutions/platforms for other 
firms to use. The attractor may devote significant effort to create or distribute these solu-
tions/platforms for attracting buyer attention, but their source of revenue is disconnected from 










Table 2 : Typology of TMIs based on Malone and Crowston (2003) 
Applying this approach, we were able to consolidate the 12 TMI types presented above into the 
six archetypes that facilitate ETE. Licensing agents, patent brokers and IP auctions act as in-
termediaries in the ETE process without adding any value to the patents, thus can be consoli-
dated into the category of IP brokers. Funded Patent Aggregators, IP Investment Banks and 
Technology Transfer Firms combine patents into bundles and prepare these for commercializa-
tion, but add-little value to the IP by transforming them only to a limited degree. These types 
thus can be consolidated into the archetype of IP distributors. IP development firms perform 
own R&D in order to further develop IP they had acquired from clients, e.g. develop proto-
types or to develop IP on their own. Thus these TMIs transform the IP to a high degree. These 
IP developers suit the archetype of a creator, thus can be called IP creators. IP-backed financing 
firms as well as finance litigation funds sell the use of IP as a means for ETE. Doing this, these 
TMIs transform the IP at least to a certain degree and thus can be consolidated as IP landlords. 
TMIs that offer IP consulting and outsourcing services do not deal directly with the IP assets, 
but rather sell their competences, i.e. human resources in the form of expertise and labour, thus 
no low high
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can be consolidated as IP contractors. Online market exchanges provide web based software 
solutions, i.e. web portals for their clients to advertise IP. Using these platforms, online market 
exchanges support their clients to catch the attention of potential buyers, thus can be regarded 
as IP attractors. Table 2 provides an overview of the TMI types presented above.  
To conclude, although certainly some services appear to be more promising than others and it 
remains to be seen which will survive in the long run, different models exist today providing a 
variety of services to facilitate ETE through the reduction or elimination of obstacles through-
out ETE transactions. Having reviewed the literature on the functions of intermediaries for 
ETE, we realized that no systematic typology for TMIs existed so far. Applying two conceptual 
models by Osterwalder (2004) and Malone and Crowston (2003) throughout this chapter a two 
step procedure we proposed a typology consisting of six different TMIs archetypes. 
In the following we present insights into four successful transactions that were completed   
through a particular type of IP Brokers, namely IP auctions. Throughout this study, several 
experts indicated to us in various interviews that IP auctions seem to be a promising business 
model to facilitate ETE. We follow their advice with this study, although we cannot make any 
judgements with certainty whether IP auctions will become a prominent model for the market 
in the future.  
 
4  An Introduction to IP Auctions 
Throughout the first part of this paper we investigated new models that facilitate ETE while in 
the following second part of this paper we focus on IP auctions as one particular model. In 
order to derive insights into IP auctions, we focus on the analysis of two elements. Firstly, we 
investigate different IP auction processes and derive a generic IP auction process following a 
comparative analysis with the aim to derive a detailed understand of transactions via IP auc-
tions. Secondly, we present case studies that take a closer look into successful transactions, i.e. 
transactions that reached particular high sales prices. With the latter analysis we aim to better 
understand sellers of IP assets, their motives, the internal management of transactions, and 
advantages and problems they see in IP auction processes.
20 However, before we start, we pro-
vide some brief introduction to auctions in general explaining key auction features, basic auc-
tion types to provide a basis of understanding for the following two analyses. 
 
                                                           
20 To address the general question, whether IP auctions can be regarded a promissing IP trade model, in 
addition to the qualitative analysis of the process and transactions presented in this paper, the forthcoming 
PhD thesis will include a quantiative analysis of a large dataset (n=1.690) of successfully sold patents via 
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4.1  Auctions – A Brief Introduction to Relevant De-
sign Features 
Auctions have been used from time immemorial, but entered economics literature relatively 
recently. Klemperer (2004, p.16) reports from a survey across the auction literature that aside 
the wide application of auctions in practice, the “full flowering of auction theory came only at 
the end of the 1970s with the contributions from Milgrom, in papers both on his own and with 
Weber; from Riley, in papers with Maskin and with Samuelson; and from Myerson, among 
others, in addition to more from Wilson.” 
Auctions can be applied to determine prices of goods that are hard to value, particularly when 
goods are unique, for new and individual goods (e.g. art pieces) or used goods which are 
unique in the sense that even once identical goods where used to different extents, thus are in a 
different condition at a certain point, and goods that are new to the world and thus particularly 
novel (e.g. 3G licenses). For goods where no comparable prices exist, values need to be deter-
mined. In general auctions are regarded as a proper way doing this by e.g. Klemperer (2004, 
p.16), or Milgrom (2005). According to Birkenmeier (2003) compared to cost based valuation 
approaches market based valuation approaches, for which auctions are an example, take into 
account the utility of a technology, respectively IP asset. Although, according to Milgrom 
(2005, p.251) “the auction itself is just one part of the transaction. The success of depends even 
more on what happens before and after the auction.” According to Berz (2007) auctions are 
used as a particular competitive negotiation method and in contrast to bilateral buyer negotia-
tions. As negotiations appear everywhere in the daily business, auctions can be found in multi-
ple contexts and for a wide range of products. This ranges from private online auctions, pur-
chasing auctions for awarding contracts and placing orders, sales of real estate properties, 
business models or even whole companies. Due to the huge number of different applications of 
auctions at so many occasions it is difficult to classify these.  
4.1.1  Basic Auction Types 
Throughout the literature, a variety of auction types exist. However, aside from some particular 
recurrent auction types, we were not able to find a detailed systematic typology of the different 
auction types in the literature.
21 However, for our study it is not necessary to provide a full and 
all-encompassing review of the literature, but rather to present insights into relevant auction 
design features. Thus, in the following we discuss key elements to differentiate four main auc-
tion types to illustrate the differences.  
                                                           
21 We would like to note that for reasons unknown to us, the existing auction theory literature provides 
very little systematic categorization of the different auction features. Although several literature reviews 
exist, having reviewed the literature independently by three students, the categorization of the different 
features appears to us very unsystematic and incomplete. Besides, the literature focuses merely on theo-
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According to Milgrom (2005), Berz (2007) and Klemperer (2004) in practice auctions are 
commonly distinguished by the direction in which goods flow, i.e. sales or purchase auctions 
taking the seller or buyer perspective, auctions for single or multiple items, and single or dou-
ble side auctions. At purchase auction the winner delivers a service or product and receives the 
bid prices Berz (2007, p.30). In the following we do not deal particularly with any issues re-
lated to procurement auctions, because the focus of this study is on IP exploitation, thus IP 
sales. However, we would like to note that many similarities between these two auction types 
exist and often the same argumentation applies when just mirroring the attributes. Following 
Klemperer (2004, p.15), because there are “no formal distinctions between normal auctions, in 
which the auctioneer is the seller and the bidders are buyers who have values for the object(s) 
sold, and procurement auctions, where the auctioneer is a buyer and the bidders are sellers who 
have costs of supplying the object(s) bought.” Because we analyze exploitation processes and 
apply the seller perspective the focus of our study is on sales auctions. We thus neglect pur-
chase auctions in the following.  
According to Kumar and Feldman (1998) the design of the bidding procedure can be character-
ized by three dimensions: the upward or downward tendency of the bidding, the order of the 
bidding, and way how the price is set which the winner has to pay. However, reviewing the 
literature, we believe that a proper analysis of auction types has to take into account four fea-
tures.
22 The first feature is related to the development of the price throughout an auction, i.e. 
whether the price is raised (ascending) or lowered (descending). In ascending auctions, the bids 
increase with every bid being made, while in descending auctions, each following bid is lower 
than the previous one. The intervals by which the bids ascend or descend can be either fixed by 
the auctioneer (e.g. through a ticker) or can be left open to the decision of the bidder. In the 
latter case the bidder decided itself how much to raise/lower the bid, although often a minimum 
interval (e.g. 10%) is defined in the auction rules. A second feature to differentiate auctions is 
the price logic. In general two categories are differentiated throughout the literature. Either the 
winner has to pay the final bid price (first-price) or the winner has to pay the second highest 
bid price (second-price). However, several authors argue following Vickrey (1961) a first price 
auction often does not lead to maximum revenues for the auctioneer, because the winning bid 
needs to be just marginally higher than the second highest bid, thus does not necessarily be 
equal to the maximum willingness to pay of the winner. In order to improve the outcome of the 
auction for the auctioneer, Vickrey (1961) suggested the second price auctions. In second price 
auctions, the winner pays not the highest bid, but rather the second highest bid. Thus bidders 
are incentivised to bid closer to their indifference price, what optimized the outcome of the 
auction.
23 A third feature to differentiate auctions is related to the way how bids are submitted. 
The way bids are usually submitted either as open bids, thus bids from all bidders are known to 
                                                           
22 The following paragraph is the outcome of an own systematisation following extensive readings includ-
ing Moldovanu (2005), Ockenfels, Reiley et al. (2006) and Bulow and Klemperer (June 2007).  
23 For a detailed reasoning of this mechanism see e.g. Klemperer (2004) © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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the other bidders, or closed, sometimes called sealed bids. In the latter case the bid of each 
bidder stays unknown to the other bidders. A mixed form is the case, when the auctioneer an-
nounces all different bids but without announcing the respective bidder name. A fourth feature 
to distinguish auctions is the duration of the auction that can be set by a time limit or by the 
number of bidding rounds. A particular distinction has to be made between the cases where 
bidders are allowed to bid only once or multiple times. Auctions can last several rounds or the 
minimum one round, which can take minutes, weeks or sometimes months. The auctioneer can 
set a maximum duration of the auction or rather determine maximum durations for the single 
rounds. In case an auction follows two or more rounds, the auctioneer can decide to set breaks 
between the rounds. Breaks can be preferred when the bidders need time to rethink their indif-
ference prices depending on additional information gathered during the bidding, e.g. knowing 
the bids of the other bidders or at least the announcement of the anonymous bids by the auc-
tioneer after closing any round.  
Klemperer (2004) claims that four basic types of auctions are widely used. These include the 
ascending-bid auction (also called the open, oral, or English auction), the descending-bid auc-
tion (also called the Dutch auction), the first-price sealed-bid auction, and the second-price 
sealed-bid auction (also called the Vickrey auction). We follow his advice as one of the most 
cited scholars in this field and present these four auction types according to the features dis-
cussed above in the following. However, we dismiss the fourth feature, because it is not as 
strong as the other three. For simplicity reasons we concentrate on the sale of a single object. 
Table 3 provides an overview of these four types. 
 







bid auction (Vickrey) 
Price  
development  Ascending   Descending  Hidden   Hidden 
Price logic  Second price   First price   First price   Second price  
Submission  
of bids  Open  Open   Sealed bid   Sealed bid  
Table 3 : Overview of main features of four commonly used auction types 
In the English auction, the price is successively raised until only one bidder remains, and that 
bidder wins the object at the final bid price. This auction can be run by the seller announcing 
the price, or by having the bidders calling out prices themselves, or by having bids submitted 
e.g. electronically with the best current bid posted. Two additional rules are often applied to 
this general setting. One rule does not allow bidders to step into the bidding again, if they 
dropped out once. The other common rule applied is that bidders are not allowed to make large 
“jump bids”. Antiques and artworks are commonly sold using versions of the ascending auc-
tion, and houses are sometimes sold this way, too. Different types of ascending auctions are 
discussed by Bikhchandani and Riley (1991). The descending or Dutch auction works in the 
opposite way. The auctioneer starts at a high price, that is usually higher than the expected 
willingness to pay of any bidder and then lowers the price continuously. The first bidder who © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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calls out that she will accept the current price wins the object at the bid price. Examples for 
applications of Dutch auctions are flower auctions in the Netherlands and fish auctions in Is-
rael, or tobacco in Canada.  
In the first-price sealed-bid auction each bidder independently submits a single bid, without 
seeing others’ bids, and the object is sold to the bidder who makes the highest bid. The winner 
pay her bid (i.e., the price is the highest or “first” price bid). First-price sealed-bid auctions are 
commonly used for auctioning mineral rights in government-owned land. In the second-price 
sealed-bid auction or Vickrey auction, also, each bidder independently submits a single bid, 
without seeing others’ bids, and the object is sold to the bidder who makes the highest bid. 
However, the price she pays is the second-highest bidder’s bid. In practice the price paid is 
often that of the lowest winning bidder. Among economists Vickrey auctions are studied often 
because of its “attractive theoretical properties”, however, this auction type is used less com-
monly in practice. Rothkopf, Teisberg et al. (1990) provide some discussions why this is the 
case.
24 Few examples where Vickrey auctions are used in practice are for stamps
25 by mail or 
for other goods in some auctions on the internet. Since the equivalence of descending and first-
price sealed-bid auctions is completely general in single-unit auctions, and ascending and sec-
ond-price sealed-bid auctions are also equivalent und many conditions (and have similar prop-
erties more broadly) these auctions types are usually referred to as first-price and second-price 
auctions.  
4.1.2  A Generic Auction Process 
Having reviewed the literature, we chose the model for a generic auction process as presented 
by Kumar and Feldman (1998) as one of the detailed descriptions we found. According to 
Kumar and Feldman (1998), the heart of negotiations is a ‘negotiable deal’ which is modified 
by the participants in the negotiations with the aim of reaching a ‘final deal’ or ‘trade’. Conse-
quently the negotiation process includes five key elements (1) a deal which can be in various 
states such as negotiable, final offer from buyer or seller, or a settled trade, (2) participants 
such as buyers, sellers, auctioneers, or brokers, (3) messages sent by the participants to modify 
the deal, e.g. messages are bids and offers to buy or sell, and price changes, (4) a process flow 
describing how the state of the deal changes as a result of the messages sent by the participants, 
and (5) messages sent to the participants as the deal changes. 
                                                           
24 Rothkopf, Teisberg et al. (1990) found seven reasons why Vickrey auctions are so rarely used. From 
these they rejected five (multiple objects for sale, bidder risk aversion, bidder asymmetry, nonindependent 
values, inertia) but found accountability of two (bidder fear of bid taker cheating, bidder resistance to 
truth revealing strategies). 
25 According toRothkopf, Teisberg et al. (1990), in some auctions of collectible items such as stamps and 
autographs, the auction involves both mailed-in sealed bids based on a catalog listing as well as oral bids. © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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Focusing on the auction process, according to Kumar and Feldman (1998), it comprises of five 
phases. In chronological order these are the (1) initial buyer/seller registration, (2) setting up a 
particular auction event, (3) bidding, (4) evaluation of bids and closing the auction, and finally, 
(5) the trade settlement. The first phase deals with the issues relating to authentication. The 
second phase deals with the description of the items that are to be sold, setting up the rules of 
the auction, explaining the parameters for negotiation including the price, delivery dates, op-
tions to purchase more or less, and the terms of payment. The bidding phase implements the 
bid control rules of the auction, and for open cry auctions notification of the participants when 
higher bids are submitted. The fourth phase implements the auction closing rules and notifies 
the winners as well as the losers of the auction. The final phase handles the payment to the 
seller, the transfer of goods to the buyer, and if the seller is not the auctioneer, payment of fees 
to the auctioneer.  
Because the buyer and seller registration as well as the trade settlement phases are common to 
all business negotiations in the following we do not discuss the first and last phases but rather 
focus on the three ‘middle’ phases. 
According to Kumar and Feldman (1998) the second phase of the process, i.e. the phase to 
create auction rules and the announcement of the auction includes five issues that have to be 
managed. The first issue is the selection of the proper auction type. As discussed in chapter 
4.1.1  many generic auction types exist and within each method several variations, thus select-
ing a proper type can be a challenging issue. The second issue relates to the scheduling of the 
auction event. According to Kumar and Feldman (1998) one of the crucial success factors for 
an auction company is to bring the maximum number of buyers interested in a commodity to 
the auction event of that commodity. Two simple means of fostering this goal are auctioning 
commodities of interest to a common buyer together, to set up a regular schedules and publish-
ing the auction date well in advance so that potential buyers can set aside time to participate in 
the auction. Furthermore, Kumar and Feldman (1998) recommend to mix popular auctions with 
less popular ones to force people to be present in the less popular auctions. Alerting potential 
buyers comprises the third issue in this phase. Kumar and Feldman (1998) recommends that 
potential buyers who have pre-registered with the auction company and have indicated their 
interest in any item being scheduled for an auction should be alerted when an auction of inter-
est to them is scheduled. Furthermore, a fourth issue is related to security considerations. Secu-
rity mechanisms are needed for various reasons, e.g. to ensure that information on interested 
buyers but as well as details on the items offered remain secret. Finally, for various reason the 
auction company might restrict access to the auction. The auction house policy and the instruc-
tions from the seller would dictate whether the auction is accessible to the public at large, to the 
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buyers/sellers registered with the auction services, or only to buyers registered to participate in 




Figure 3 : Schematic view of a generic auction process
26 
In the third phase of the auction process, which is related to the bidding procedure, according 
to Kumar and Feldman (1998) five issues have to be taken into account. The bidding procedure 
is defined as the process from the start of the bidding, the so called opening bid until the end of 
the auction is reached. This is usually the case until only one bidder is left willing to pay the 
highest bid or until all items are successfully sold. Firstly, Kumar and Feldman (1998) raised 
the issue of ‘notification’, i.e. the mechanism to update the bidders on the latest bidding ac-
tions. In classical offline auctions through which the bidders are present this issue is of little 
difficulty. However, if bidders are not personally present in the bidding room they have to be 
informed about the developments of the bidding. The notification can then be done over the 
phone or the internet with connections ranging from permanently held by each bidder for the 
duration of the auction to a manual refresh on client request. Secondly the auction company has 
set the terms and conditions and make these available to the sellers and buyers. If the bidding 
process allows the buyers to request changes of the payment or shipping terms, these terms 
should be treated as part of the bid. The auction chart should display the terms and conditions 
offered along side the bids shown. Furthermore, when creating the product description, the 
seller should specify the range of terms and conditions acceptable to him and indicate how they 
are factored in bid evaluation. Thirdly, the auction company has to decide on the deposits of the 
bids. Depending on various issues, a deposit may be required, or a bond may have to be posted 
before a bidder can participate in an auction. Throughout the bidding certain security measures 
might have to be considered. Particularly in sealed bid processes the auction company has to 
ensure that a bid submitted is not tampered, that it is not disclosed to other bidders in violation 
of the auction rules. In open cry auctions, spurious bids injected by the seller or auctioneer to 
prompt the highest bidder to further increase his bids, maybe need to be prevented. Fourthly, 
retraction of bids needs to be defined. During the bidding phase, under certain conditions the 
seller may be allowed to stop or withdraw the auction or modify the rules. Similarly, under 
certain conditions the bidders should be allowed to withdraw or modify their bids. Finally, 
defining the closing of the auction is an important issue. Normally the auction would close 
according to the closing rules specified. At this time the winning bids can be treated as, and if 
needed translated to, traditional purchase orders.  
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In the fourth phase, the closing of the auction, according to Kumar and Feldman (1998) three 
activities need to take place. Firstly, the auctioneer must communicate the results of the auction 
to the bidders. Depending on the auction policy some information would be made available 
publicly, some common information would be made available to all bidders, and some would 
be communicated only to bidders to whom it is relevant. Once again security and privacy rules 
might be needed. If the auctioneer is not the seller himself, the auction results must be commu-
nicated to the seller also. The auction results comprise of the winning bidder’s or top few bid-
der’s names and addresses, the bid amounts, and the shipping and payment terms if the bidding 
process allowed changes to these terms. Secondly, the auctioneer must prove to the bidders and 
the seller that he conducted the auction fairly (record retention). The seller needs to maintain it 
for his own internal book keeping requirements and to prove that government rules and regula-
tions such as fair trade practices were met. The record retention policy will vary from organiza-
tion to organization, and will also depend on the monetary value of the transaction and com-
modity being sold. The records usually include the product description, when and where it was 
posted, and for what period. It could include the list of bidders who participated and the log of 
the bids. The evaluation method should also be retained as part of the records. The auction 
record would be digitally signed by the auctioneer.  
Having provided insights into key features of auctions in general, basic auction types, and 
having presented a model of a generic auction type by Kumar and Feldman (1998), in the fol-
lowing we present the results from empirical analysis of IP auction processes and successful 
transactions.  
4.2  A Generic IP Auction Process 
In order to derive a generic IP auction process we chose a three step procedure. Firstly, we 
investigated auction processes that were designed by two companies, OceanTomo (OT) and IP 
Auctions GmbH (IPA) for six IP auctions.
27 Noteworthy is that OT held five of these auctions 
and adjusted the process slightly over time. Assuming that OT made the adjustments to the 
process throughout the auctions in order to improve the process, we investigate only the proc-
ess of the latest IP auction of OT in our dataset. Secondly, we conducted a comparative analysis 
of the processes by OT and IPA with the aim to identify similarities and differences. Finally, to 
derive a generic IP auction process we transferred our qualitative observations into the ETE 
process model proposed by Lichtenthaler (2006) as one of the few available, empirically de-
rived and commonly cited process model for ETE. 
We investigated the auction processes of OT and IPA using the official publications of the two 
organizers, mainly auction catalogues, including detailed descriptions of terms and conditions, 
                                                           
27 OT performed its first public multi-lot live IP auction in San Francisco on 06.04.2006. Until autumn 
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interviews and corporate websites. Furthermore, we personally attended the IPA auction in 
Munich on 15.05.2007 and the OT auction in London on 01.06.2007.
28 Having investigated the 
auction processes of OT and IPA we conducted a comparative analysis of the processes by 
identifying similarities as well as differences in order to then propose a generic IP auction 
process. 
4.2.1  Comparative Analysis of IP Auction Processes 
We proceed throughout this chapter is three steps. Firstly, we compare the general structure of 
the two auction processes throughout the individual process phases including the duration of 
each phase. Secondly we discuss similarities and difference of relevant elements in the bidding 
process and thirdly we compare the fee structure and assessment base of the fees charged by 
the two auction companies. 
Comparing the general structure of the IP auction processes, we found that both companies 
initiated the auction process with the development of a set of ‘terms & conditions’ as a first 
initial task
29 followed by an announcement of the auction event to the public. Having an-
nounced the date and place through their corporate websites and other publications, including 
IP expert journals, newsletters targeted to the community but as well regular newspapers. OT, 
having already organized several auctions, additionally used the auction catalogue to promote 
the next upcoming auctions.  
Together with the publication of the catalogues, the auction companies invited sellers to submit 
IP assets for sale. For both auction processes the sellers had to complete a registration proce-
dure and deliver certain documents for an internal evaluation. OT performed the examination 
internally after the company had acquired a specialized patent rating company. IPA conducted 
the examination with support of its mother company IPB. Having evaluated the IP assets, IP 
assets that fulfilled internal quality criteria were accepted, the others rejected. These were 
compiled in an auction catalogue, which was then published.  
On the one hand the auction company used the catalogue for marketing purposes and on the 
other hand the catalogue was a tool for interested buyers to conduct a first screening of the 
offerings based on mainly public bibliographical data, thus some first information for a due 
diligence. The information provided in the catalogues by OT and IPA was almost similar. Inter-
ested buyers were then invited to register on the companies’ websites. They had to provide a 
signed bidder registration form and a bidder agreement, for which a draft was published in the 
respective auction catalogue. In case buyers were not able to attend the bidding session person-
ally, they had to further provide a signed alternative bid form. In addition, interested buyers had 
                                                           
28 During the auctions we had further possibilities to interview several sellers, the organizers and IP spe-
cialists (lawyers, economists, and IP professionals) attending the auctions. 
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to provide a bank guarantee and in case the buyers would send a bidding agent, they had to 
deliver a written authorization confirmation. Furthermore, interested buyers had to pay a bidder 
registration fee.  
Having completed the registration procedure, interested buyers received access data to the 
online data room in order to conduct in depth due diligences on IP assets they were interested 
in. The data rooms offered the possibility to review detailed data on specific IP assets provided 
by the sellers but as well to directly contact the seller to request additional data. Both auction 
companies used online data rooms from third party providers.
30 In addition to the data rooms 
both companies had engaged a specific IP evaluation firm to produce detailed reports for buy-
ers on certain IP assets on request and for additional payments. Thus, throughout the two auc-
tion processes interested buyers had four information sources to evaluate IP assets: The cata-
logue, the data room, personal or telephone meetings with the sellers, and reports for specific 
IP assets buyers could request from a third party that was engaged by the auction companies.  
Table 4 provides an overview of the publication dates of the catalogues and the auction dates. 
From these we can calculate the length of the period in which interested buyers could conduct a 
due diligence. The length of this duration varied from auction to auction. However, it does not 
seem that a systematic difference exists between the two auction companies.
31 Following the 
due diligence phase, the auction event took place. The auctions were governed by a set of terms 
and conditions and carried out by an independent auction firm.  
 
 No.  Catalogue publication date  Auction date  Due diligence period (weeks) 
1 14.02.2006 06.04.2006  7 
2 Aug  2006 26.10.2006  8-12 
3 25.01.2007 19.04.2007  12 
4 n.a 15.05.2007  unknown 
5 25.04.2007 01.06.2007  5 
6 21.08.2007 25.10.2007  9 
  
  Average due diligence period:  8.2 - 9 
Table 4 : Length of due diligence period of six IP auctions 
Following the IP auction both companies provided the opportunity to unsuccessful bidders and 
sellers to continue with the negotiations after the bidding ended throughout a post auction 
                                                           
30 IPA offered a data room by Data Room Services GmbH & Co. KG. OT offers the online data room by 
IntraLinks, Inc.  
31 Whether the available time for the due diligence can be regarded as sufficient, appears difficult to 
judge. The available literature does not indicate nor provide any recommendations for a sufficient length 
of such period. However, according to Niioka (2006) an average of seven weeks should be regarded as 
relatively insufficient, particularly because not all interested buyers might be aware of the upcoming 
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phase. Throughout this phase the rules governing the post-auction sales differed between OT 
and IPA. Unsuccessful lots at IPA were subject to post auction sales up to six months after the 
auction event; whereas OT required a commission payment if the offered IP assets are sold at 






Figure 4 : Three phase structure of the OT and IPA auction processes
32 
To conclude, no major differences in the general structure of the auction processes developed 
by OT and IPA exist.
33 The processes followed a similar structure as illustrated in the following 
figure. The figure shows three key events in the process. The process started always with the 
announcement of the auction, followed by a seller registration and evaluation of submitted IP 
assets. The second event was the publication of the auction catalogue, followed then by the 
bidder registration and the due diligence. The third event was the auction as such on which 
certain IP assets were sold. The IP assets that remained unsold were then available throughout 
the post auction sales period.  
A central event in the auction process is the design of the auction event, particularly the bid-
ding process. Comparing the bidding processes embedded in the auction processes as devel-
oped by OT and IP we identified three elements with relevance on the outcome of the auctions: 
the types of IP assets bidders could bid on, the auction type used for bidding and the MRP. 
Both companies accepted different IP types for sale. These included patents, trademarks, copy-
rights, and domain names. The IP assets were offered in lots, while a lot could comprise one or 
more related IP assets bundled together, however usually only of one type. In addition to these 
four IP asset types offered by OT and IPA, IPA offered as well licenses for sale. Only licenses 
were accepted for which the license rights could be acquired through a lumpsum payment only 
or through a down payment with following royalty payments. In addition to the documents 
sellers had to provide a license contract in the data room to interested buyers. Both OT and IPA 
used different auction types. In the six auctions of our dataset, OT had applied only English 
auctions (first-price or open-cry auction), while IPA had applied English as well as Dutch auc-
                                                           
32 Based on our own research 
33 We would like to note that very few companies had performed IP auctions before IPA developed its 
auction process, thus it seems likely to us that IPA had developed their process taking into account learn-
ings from OT. 
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tions (see chapter 4.1.1). Although increasingly discussed in the literature, the "first-price 
sealed-bid" auction (Vickrey-auction) was not used so far.  
 
   OT  IPA 
IP asset  types  Patents, trademarks, copy-
rights, Domain names 
Patents, trademarks, copyrights, Do-
main names, licenses 
Auction types  English  English, Dutch 
MRP  A1: Confidential (not pub-
lished) 
A2: Not published (assumed 





Table 5 : Comparison of feature of the bidding processes as designed by OT and IPA 
In the auctions both companies employed the MRP feature. However its amounts differed as 
charged by the auction companies as well as in the case of OT from auction to auction. At the 
first and second auction OT kept the MRP confidential, thus the MRP was not known to the 
bidders. OT changed this strategy after its second auction. In the following US auctions (A3, 
A5) the MRP was then announced to be $10,000, while the MRP was £5,000 at the UK auction 
(A4). On their first auction IPA set the MRP to €25,000, thus had chosen a considerably higher 
MRP than OT had applied at any prior auction. The respective MRPs set by OT and IP at the 
six auctions have to be regarded as a ‘standard’ MRP as defined by the auction company. Seller 
however always had the chance to specify own MRPs for any IP asset they offered for sale. 
Analyzing  mandatory fees charged by the auction companies from sellers and buyers 
throughout the two processes, it appears that both companies charged two different types of 
fees, the registration fees and the commission fees due on successful sales at the auction and 
throughout the post auction sales. Both types of fees were charged to sellers as well to buyers, 
although the amounts differed. Table 6 provides an overview of the fee structures.  
On the one hand sellers and interested buyers had to pay a registration fee in order to be al-
lowed to participate in the auction. However both auction companies charged different registra-
tion fees depending on different variables.  
For sellers OT based the registration fee on three criteria, the IP asset type, the number of IP 
assets bundled together, and the MRP. Sellers were allowed to define an own MRP for any IP 
asset. In this case, the registration fee for this IP asset was considerably higher. IPA based the 
seller registration fee on two criteria, the number of IP assets and the MRP. In case the seller 
specified an own MRP, IPA charged a variable fee of 3% on the sales price. This additional fee 
was thus only due in case of a successful sale.  
For buyers OT charged a flat fee of $1,500 for participating in the auction. IPA however 
charged the registration fee of buyers depending on the type of bidding. IPA charged the high-© Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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est fee for live bidding, thus being personally present in the auction room. For ‘outside’ bidding 
the fee was half the price (for telephone bidding) and 1/3 of the fee for absentee bidding.  
 
  OT IPA 
Registration fees 
  Sellers  Depending on IP asset type, 
number of IP assets and 
MRP  
 
For one patent*: 
$1,000 with OT MRP 
$3,000 with own MRP 
 
For a ‘patent pool’, i.e. bun-
dle: 
$1,000 with OT MRP 
$6,000 with own MRP 
 
*Analogue for other IP asset types 
Depending on number of IP assets 
and MRP 
 
Single IP asset: €1,000 
Two or more IP assets: €2,000 
 
Own MRP: Plus 3% fee on the 
sales price  
  Buyers  Fixed fee of $1,500  Depending on type of bidding 
Live bidding: €1,500 
Outside bidding: €750 (tele-
phone); €500 (absentee) 
Commission fees 
  Sellers  15% on sales price  15% on sales price 
  Buyers  10% on sales price  10% on sales price 
Table 6 : Comparison of fee structures from OT and IPA auctions 
On the other hand sellers and buyers were charged a commission fee for successful sales. Sur-
prisingly this fee was similar for the OT and IPA auctions. Sellers had to pay a premium of 
15% on the sales prices (disagio) and buyers were charged 10% on the sales price (agio). 
As a result from the analysis of the individual IP auction processes
34 on the one hand and the 
comparative analysis of those on the other hand we can now propose an IP auction process for 
ETE. 
 
4.2.2  Deriving a Generic IP Auction Process  
Having described and compared different IP auction processes we use and adapt the generic 
ETE process model from Lichtenthaler (2006) to derive a generic IP auction process being a 
specific ETE process. However, to create a better understanding of the various stakeholders 
and their relationships we firstly discuss the roles of these throughout the IP auction process. 
From the comparison of the different IP auction processes we learned that throughout IP auc-
tions processes three main stakeholders are directly involved. Additionally the auction compa-
nies engaged dedicated service firms to support particular tasks with specialized know how. 
For analyzing the relationships of these stakeholders we apply a holistic ETE framework as 
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proposed by (Tietze, 2009).
35 According to this framework any ETE transaction consists of five 
elements: three main actors (stakeholders) including sellers on the supply side, interested par-
ties on the demand side, and intermediaries facilitating the process, as well as two key ele-
ments, the transaction process, and the traded assets. Figure 5 illustrates the monetary and legal 
relationships between the three main stakeholders involved in IP auctions. Additionally, our 
analysis revealed that a fourth stakeholder is involved in IP auctions. Dedicated service firms 
are engaged by the auction company to provide specialized know how for particular tasks. 
However, in the following our main focus is on the roles of the three main stakeholders.  
On the supply side (left) owners of IP assets as well as intermediaries (e.g. law firms) acting on 
behalf of owners offer IP assets for sale. The sellers have to register and provide information 
on any IP asset they offer for sale. Before the IP assets are accepted for an auction, the auction 
company carries out a first evaluation reserving the right to reject certain IP asset. For the IP 
assets accepted for an auction, the owner has to provide detailed legal, economic and technical 
information on the assets history to enable buyers to properly evaluate the IP asset carrying out 
a due diligence in a secure data room. In case of a successful sale, the seller receives a payment 
from the buyer in exchange for the ownership rights. Although the seller has to discount a 
commission fee from the sales price payable to the auction company. 
On the demand side (right) potential buyers willing to acquire IP assets throughout a bidding 
session turn into buyers in case of a successful bid. Having proved the financial ligitimy and 
thus successfully registered for an auction interested buyers perform a due diligence on IP 
assets they want to acquire prior to the bidding session. If a bid is successfully closed the buyer 
has to pay the sales price to the seller in exchange for the ownership rights of the IP asset as 








Figure 5 : Relationships of stakeholders involved in IP auction processes
36 
                                                           
35 The framework is essentially a stakeholder analysis of ETE transactions and will be further discussed in 
more detail by Tietze (2009 (forthcoming)).  
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As a third stakeholder the auction company provides the infrastructure for the transactions 
including different services provided to the sellers and bidders/buyers. To the sellers the auc-
tion company provides mainly marketing support and a standardized legal framework for car-
rying out the negotiations and transferring the ownership rights. The marketing efforts are 
twofold. On the one hand the auction company tries to maximize the likelihood to find a buyer 
interested in the offered IP assets and on the other hand the auction companies tries to maxi-
mize the outcome of the auction, i.e. maximizing the sales prices. The auction company bun-
dles all offerings in a catalogue, draws attention of potential buyers to the auction through press 
and media coverage, and identifies companies for specifically targeted marketing that might be 
interested in particular IP assets. Furthermore, the auction company ensures that only solvent 
buyers participate in the auction. For interested buyers, the auction company performs multiple 
services. The auction company performs a first evaluation of all delivered IP assets and filters 
out IP assets that do not fulfil a minimum quality level, e.g. patents that are too old and shortly 
before expiration. If a buyer becomes interested in a particular IP asset, then the auction com-
pany provides support throughout the due diligence. The auction company organizes a secure 
data room and facilitates possibilities for direct information exchange through e.g. personal 
meetings. In the phases following the due diligence the auction company then provides a stan-
dardized legal framework for negotiations, i.e. the bidding as well as rules and standardized 
contracts for transferring the ownership rights in case a bid is successfully closed. For offering 
these services, the buyers pay a participation fee as well as a commission fee on the final sales 
price for each sold IP asset. 
In addition to the three main stakeholders, service companies can be engaged by the auction 
company to carry out dedicated tasks. The tasks include valuation of IP assets, technical pro-
vider for the secure online data room but as well the guidance through the bidding session by 
an independent auctioneer. In certain cases even the buyers want to commission an independent 
third party company to carry out a detailed evaluation of any particular IP asset.  
Having described the roles of the different stakeholders throughout the IP auction process we 
can derive a generic structure of an IP auction process with regard to the three main stake-
holders. According to the model by Lichtenthaler (2006) we distinguish the process into the 
three main phases, the planning, the negotiation and the realization phase.
 37 Each phase, we 
further distinguish into individual steps for which we assign the stakeholders involved in each 
step.  
According to Lichtenthaler (2006) any exploitation project starts with the planning phase that 
comprises four tasks: strategic technology planning, target setting, resource allocation and ETC 
customer pre-selection. In the specific case of IP auctions, both auction companies initiated the 
planning phase with the development of a set of terms and conditions for an upcoming auction, 
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followed then by the announcement of the auction date to the public as a second step usually 
about three month prior to the auction event. In these two steps, only the auction company was 
involved. Having announced the auction to the public owners of IP assets are invited to deliver 
IP assets for sale to the auction company. Sellers have to pay a registration fee depending on 
different criteria (e.g. type of IP asset) and to provide mainly bibliographic information for 
each IP asset through the auction company’s web interface. In this third step of the planning 
phase, the auction company and sellers are involved. Following the delivery of IP assets, the 
auction company carries out a first internal evaluation of the IP assets in order to decide which 
IP assets will be accepted or will be rejected. Having decided about which IP assets are ac-
cepted the auction company compiles and publishes the auction catalogue. Interested buyers 
can use the catalogue for a first screening of the offerings. Being interested in particular IP 
assets, interested buyers can register for the auction. To register interested buyers have to pro-
vide a bank warranty and pay a registration fee. The auction company guides interested buyers 
through this process providing pre-produced registration forms. Thus throughout this step these 
two stakeholders are involved. The planning phase ends with the completed registration of the 
interested buyers, thus consists of six steps.  
According to Lichtenthaler (2006) the negotiation phase is the second phase of any ETE proc-
ess characterized by the possibility for buyers and sellers to exchange information. 
Lichtenthaler (2006) differentiated this phase further in the pre-negotiation phase and the de-
tailed negotiation phase. In a first step of this phase, interested buyers can access additional 
information on the IP assets complementing the information provided in the catalogue getting 
access to a secure data room which is usually provided online. Interested buyers can carry out a 
due diligence reviewing and evaluating detailed legal, technical and economical information 
provided by the sellers. Additionally interested buyers can directly contact the sellers and re-
quest further detailed information. In this step of the pre-negotiation process mainly the sellers 
and interested buyers interact, although the auction company provides the infrastructure to 
enable and facilitate the interaction.  
The auction event follows the pre-negotiation phase as the ‘main’ negotiation phase. Organized 
by the auction company and following pre-determined rules and regulations interested buyers 
bid on IP assets offered on the auction event. However, sellers and interested buyers do not 
interact directly. The auction company rather acts as an agent for all sellers, although the auc-
tion company usually contracts an independent auctioneer from a specialized auction firm. 
Bids can be placed in person, using an agent, by phone or as absentee, thus delivering a maxi-
mum price prior to the auction to the auction company. At past auctions mainly open outcry 
English auctions were used. The auctions companies used the MRP feature to ensure a mini-
mum price. In case the bidding reaches the MRP specified by the seller, bids are closed suc-
cessfully. Due to the fact that the auction uses standardized contracts, no addition negotiations 
are necessary for particular clauses. If a bid is closed successfully, the negotiation phase is 
finished and the process continues into the realization phase. If however, the MRP is not 
reached in the bidding session the IP asset is withdrawn from the auction. In this case, inter-© Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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ested buyers can engage into further negotiations. For any sale closed throughout these ‘post 
auction sales’ for a varying period the auction company reserves a right to still receive the 
commission fees from the seller and buyer. The negotiation phase finishes if a seller and a 













Figure 6 : Detailed illustration of a generic IP auction process structure
38 
Having signed a contract on the auction event or throughout the post auction sales the transfer 
of the ownership rights of the sold IP asset from the seller to the buyer is the first step in the 
realization phase. In exchange to the ownership rights, the new owner pays the sales price to 
the seller, plus a commission fee (adgio) on the sales price to the auction company (usually 
10%). Furthermore the seller pays a commission fee for each successful deal (disadgio) to the 
auction company too (usually 15%). Following the transfer of the ownership rights and the 
payments of the sales price and the commission fees the new owner might receive additional 
tacit knowledge through e.g. training courses from the seller. Having transferred the sales price, 
the ownership rights and additional tacit know how the realization phase finishes and thus the 
transaction is completed.  
Comparing the model of the generic IP auction process as illustrated in Figure 6 with the model 
of an general auction process proposed by Kumar and Feldman (1998) as illustrated in Figure 3 
it can be seen that the main auction activities described by Kumar and Feldman (1998) exist 
also in the generic IP auction process. However, when comparing the details of each phase it 
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can be seen that IP auctions have two specific activities not present in general auctions: the due 
diligence and the follow-up sales. Having presented a generic process model for IP auctions, in 
the following we provide insights into selected, successful ETE transactions. 
 
4.3  Successful Transactions via IP Auctions 
The following chapter illustrates how patented technologies can be sold successfully via auc-
tions. We selected four cases
39 to provide qualitative insights into transactions regarding four 
aspects, the company that exploited the technology (including motives and selection process of 
the technology), the IP, the organization of the transaction and the sellers’ perception of the 
success of the transaction. In two of the four cases the sellers were SMEs, while in the other 
two cases the sellers were multinational firms.  
4.3.1  Selection of Transactions and Data Collection 
From a dataset that comprises 156 transactions, which we compiled to conduct a quantitative 
analysis
40 we selected successful transactions according to a two step procedure. In order to 
identify ‘successful’ transactions that provide particular interesting insights for our case stud-
ies.  In a first step, we applied a filter on all 156 transactions according to the type of the seller. 
In the dataset five types of seller were classified including research institutes and universities 
(i.e. technology transfer offices), individual inventors, others (e.g. law firms) and firms. Firms 
were further classified into SMEs
41 and large firms. These two categories were the basis for us 
to select the following case studies, because our study focuses on private market actors. Having 
applied this first filter, 81 transactions remained from the dataset of 156 completed. In a second 
step, we applied a monetary, but relative measure to filter for transactions that could be re-
garded as particularly successful. From each of the six IP auctions in the dataset, we selected 
the two transactions that sold for the highest and second highest price. Applying this filter, we 
identified 12 technologies as ‘successful’ in terms of monetary returns. Applying this filter on 
each auction separately, we took into account that the different auctions have reached different 
price levels (e.g. average and maximum, absolute prices varied) that might be due to learning 
effects in the market (e.g. a first European auction reached different prices that a third Ameri-
can auction).
42 Thus we wanted to reduce the bias, i.e. that certain auctions were underrepre-
                                                           
39 An investigation of four cases certainly is not meant to provide generic evidence, but rather a first 
explorative step to better understand the nature of these transactions. 
40 Forthcoming in Tietze (2009 (forthcoming)) 
41 We have applied the official EU definition to distinguish SMEs from large firms in our sample. 
42 In a first approach, we calculated the overall average value of all 157 completed transactions and 
wanted to take into account only the transactions with sales prices above the average value. Applying this 
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sented in our sample. The list of 12 successful transactions comprised eight transactions with 
sellers being SMEs and four of which the sellers where large multinational corporations 
(MNC). The transaction volumes varied from a minimum of 25,000 € up to a maximum of 
649,044 €, with an average value of 202,000 €.  
Data for the successful transactions was collected using a questionnaire that we developed 
particularly for this study. A completed questionnaire was received for four out of the 12 trans-
actions. We developed the questionnaire according to our research questions based on a litera-
ture review drawing mainly on nine literature sources. These include the fourth version of the 
EU Community Innovation Survey (version 4, 2006), Granstrand (2000), Granstrand (2008 
(forthcoming)), using the sequential ETE process model of Lichtenthaler (2006) relevant for 
questions regarding the resource requirements in the various process phases, Gambardella, 
Giuri et al. (2007) regarding the use of as well as advantages and disadvantages of using inter-
mediaries for technology sales, Milgrom (2005) for questions related to specific advantages 
and disadvantages on the auction process compared to bilateral sales. Additionally, from Rieck 
(1993), Kaufmann (2001) and Thiele (2003) we derived questions on bilateral transactions. The 
questionnaire comprised mainly closed questions to ensure that the respondent can do answer 
the questionnaire in proper time as well as the possibility to compare the case studies following 
Atteslander and Cromm (2006). We aimed to fulfil all criteria regarding ‘accuracy, uniqueness, 
and comprehensiveness’ as required by Atteslander and Cromm (2006) and Punch (2001). 
Having finished a literature based version of the questionnaire, the content of the questionnaire 
as well as the understandability on the questions was validated with three industry experts.
43 
Having validated the questionnaire with industry experts the questionnaire was pilot tested with 
four selected companies.
44 The questionnaire was then sent out to the project managers that 
were responsible for the transactions.
45  
The questionnaire comprised of 23 questions in three parts. In the first part 15 questions ad-
dressed characteristics of the sold technology, the organisation of the transaction process inside 
the sellers’ firm and the motivation of the seller to exploit the technology as well as the selec-
tion process and its criteria. Question types on this part include yes/no questions, alternative 
                                                           
 
reached above average values. Because we did not want to exclude the transactions from the single Euro-
pean auction, we dismissed this approach.  
43 We would like to acknowledge the support, the valuable comments and suggestions from Tomas Ewing 
(IP ValueADDED), Boris Peters (IP Bewertungs AG) and Prof. C. Herstatt (Institute for Technology and 
Innovation Management, TUHH).  
44 These include Diehl Stiftung & Co. KG (Nürnberg), Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft (Munich), HILF! GmbH 
(Oberhaching) and TuTech Innovations GmbH (Hamburg),. 
45 We were able to identify the responsible project manager from eight companies of the transactions 
beforehand. For the remaining four companies, the questionnaire was directed to the head of the patent or 
licensing department with a request to forward it to the responsible project manager. © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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questions with multiple answer possibilities and closed questions with a five point Likert scale. 
One open question was included regarding cost drivers throughout the transaction. In the sec-
ond part questions were designed in order to understand advantages and disadvantages of 
transactions via auctions compared to the predominant bilateral exploitations. These questions 
have particular relevance for the analysis regarding the success of a transaction from the com-
pany’s perspective. This second part comprised four closed questions with a five point Likert 
scale plus one open question to identify further potential for improvements of technology auc-
tions. Throughout the final part of the questionnaire we collected additional corporate informa-
tion that was hardly available via the companies’ websites or annual reports. These three ques-
tions address particular the experience of the companies regarding IP exploitation as well as the 
their economic performance in the previous years. 
For the four transactions, additional data was then compiled from secondary sources. These 
include various publicly available patent databases (e.g. the USPTO and the EPO), the corpo-
rate websites provided data on the organizational structure of the sellers’ companies as well as 
on business data from previous years and the information from the respective auction cata-
logues.  
4.3.2  Results from Successful Transactions 
The cases were analyzed in a two step procedure. In a first step, each case study was analyzed 
according to the four main aspects in question, i.e. the company that exploited the technology 
(including motives and selection process of the technology), the technology as such, the or-
ganization of the transaction and their judgement on the success of the transaction. In a second 
step we conducted a comparative analysis of the four cases along these four investigated as-
pects. 
The case studies are structured according to the four major aspects of this research. The first 
part comprises information on the exploiting company (e.g. number of employees, revenues 
and industry). We emphasize further on the expertise of a company regarding IP exploitation 
and the importance of IP for that company. The exploited IP is in the focus of the second part. 
Various characteristics of the IP are described, including the age, the number of patents and the 
geographical reach of the protection. Furthermore, the origin of the IP (whether it was inter-
nally developed or externally acquired), and the strategic and operational importance of the IP 
for the owner prior to the sale. Throughout the third part the internal organization of the exploi-
tation process by the seller is described. We emphasize on who was leading the exploitation 
project, the necessary resources throughout the various exploitation phases, and the patent 
strategy of the company, who had initiated the exploitation process, which motives drove the 
exploitation. The fourth part of the analysis of each case study investigates the success of each 
transaction. Therefore we investigate the advantages and disadvantages of auctions compared 
to bilateral exploitation projects where companies use only their internal resources. Companies 
were asked to judge how successful they perceive the respective transaction compared to the 
resources that were necessary to complete the transaction, in respect to the total sales price, and © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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in comparison to the resources and costs the company had to develop the technology. The fact 
that a company had tried to exploit the technology via other ways prior to the auction is fur-
thermore an indicator for the success of the auction model that is discussed in this part. We 
discuss further how companies perceive individual aspects of the transaction process (e.g. the 
marketing by the auction company).  
Having studied four successful transactions separately, the comparative analysis follows a 
similar structure than in the descriptive analysis of each of the four cases. We started compar-
ing the sellers and the exploited IP as a basis for the understanding of the similarities and dif-
ferences in the organization of the exploitation processes. Finally we compared the perceptions 
of the advantages and disadvantages of the IP auction process compared to ‘traditional’ bilat-
eral exploitation projects and discussed the role of the auction company as a TMI throughout 
the process steps of the exploitation projects.  The results from the comparative analysis are 
presented in the following. 
4.3.2.1  The Sellers  
The IP sold throughout the four observed transactions were sold by three German and one 
Finnish company. One company was active in the chemical and pharmaceutical businesses 
(ComC), one company in the bio- and nanotechnology businesses (ComA), one in the energy, 
electrical and industrial businesses (ComD) and a Finnish company focussed on the implemen-
tation of patent strategies (ComB). The sample thus consists of two SMEs (ComA, ComB) and 
two large multinational corporations (ComC, ComD), with ComB being the smallest company 
with just one employee and ComD being the largest with 392.200 employees.  
 
Table 7 : Summary of business data of the sellers 
Total revenues of the companies were available only for the two MNCs. ComC collected reve-
nues in 2007 of about € 7,057 mio. and ComD of about € 75,500 mio. In 2007 ComC had R&D 
Company name  ComA  ComB  ComC  ComD 
Nationality   German Finnish German  German 
Main industries  Bio- and nanotech-





# of employees  ≤ 50 (Liquidations 
phase)  1  Ca. 32.000  Ca. 398.200 
Revenues (2007)  ≤ 10 Mio. €  ≤ 10 Mio. €  7.057 Mio. €  75.500 Mio. € 
R&D expenditures 
(2007)  n.A.  n.A.  1.028 Mio. €  3.500 Mio. € 
SME / MNC  SME SME  MNC  MNC 
Experience with patent 
management  Low  Low - medium  Medium - high  High  
ETE relevance  
(2002/2007/2010)  medium/ low/ low  high/ high/ high  High/ medium/ 
medium 
Low- medium / 
high - medium / 
high © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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expenditures of about € 1,028 mio. and ComD of about € 3,500 mio.
46 Based on the official EU 
definition for SMEs however both ComB and ComA qualified as SMEs.
 47  
Both SMEs do not apply institutionalized tools for patent management (e.g. use of data bases) 
or have employed a dedicated patent manager, thus their competence in patent management 
might be regarded as low. However, ComB’s business activities are focused on the implemen-
tation of patent strategies, thus the company might employ a certain competence in patent ma-
nagement. ComC as well as ComD however both make use of patent management software 
and databases and both companies run a dedicated patent management department. However, 
ComD has an IP committee in place that regularly reviews the IP portfolio as well as an ex-
plicit patent strategy with certain elements even focussing on ETE. Thus among the companies 
in our sample ComD employs the highest patent management competence.  
In 2004 ETE had a high relevance for two companies (ComB, ComC). For ComA ETE was of 
moderate relevance in the daily business and for ComD ETE had a low relevance. The rele-
vance of ETE for the company’s business remained on a high level for ComB. For ComA ETE 
became less relevant and is expected to remain on a low level until 2010. For ComC ETE be-
came less relevant and is expected to remain on a moderate level. Only for ComD ETE became 
increasingly relevant in the previous years. From 2004 to 2007 the relevance of ETE increase 
to moderate/high and is expected to remain on this level until 2010. 
This overall picture is in slide contrast to the picture the literature shows. According to e.g. 
Sheehan, Martinez et al. (2004) many companies have experienced and will experience an 
increasing importance of ETE for their businesses. However, three of the four cases expect that 
ETE will continue to be of moderate relevance in the future.  
4.3.2.2  The Exploited IP 
Throughout the four transactions two IP assets were successfully sold from the area of   
process-, bio-, nanotechnology, respectively chemicals. The other two IP assets were from 
telecommunications, respectively data transfer. Two of the technologies (ComA, ComB) were 
process technologies while the other two technologies were process and product technologies. 
Three companies had developed the technologies entirely in-house, while ComC had devel-
oped the technology in a Joint Venture.  
The age of the exploited technologies varied between 5.5 and 8 years, with an overall average 
of 6.6 years. Thus none of the technologies can be regarded as particularly young (e.g. only one 
or two years old) or particularly close to the expiration dates of the patents (e.g. 19 years old). 
The number of patents however bundled together as one lot at an auction varied however more 
                                                           
46 Due to the small size of ComB and ComA these companies refused to publish any business data. 
47 The classification was done based on the statements of the companies in the questionnaire, because no 
official data was available for the two SMEs on revenues or the number of employees. However, the 
questionnaire applied the official SME definition for the European companies.  © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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widely. ComD sold only one US patent, while ComC sold 12 patents bundled together, with an 
average of 5.75 patents per lot.  
 
Company  name  ComA ComB  ComC ComD 
Exploited technology 
Process for manu-
facturing a specific 
surface 
Technology for a 
wireless file based 
multi media data 
transfer 
Miniaturized 
analytical system  
Method for secure 
transactions using 















Average age of 
patents in lot (years)  6,096 5,497  6,982 8,073 
# of patents in lot  7  3  12  1 
Matter of protection 
in patent (Product / 
process) 
Process Combination  Combination  Process   
Development Internally  Internally Joint  Venture  Internally 
Strategic relevance 
for seller (2002/2007)  High / low  High / high  Moderate / low  Moderate / Moderate 
Operational relevance 
for seller (2002/2007)  High / low  Low / Low  Low / Low  Moderate / Moderate 
Positive Return on 
investments reached 
until auction date 
No   No   No  No 
 Table 8 : Summary of key facts of four sold technologies 
In 2002 two technologies had a moderate strategic relevance for ComD and ComC. For ComC 
the relevance decreased while it remained on a moderate level for ComD. Among the two 
SMEs both technologies had a high strategic relevance in 2002. For ComB the relevance re-
mained high in 2007, and for ComA it decreased to a low level.  
The technology sold by ComA had a high operative relevance for the company in 2002 that 
decreased until 2007 to a low level. The technologies of ComB and ComC were of low opera-
tive relevance and remained on that level, while for ComD the technology remained on a mod-
erate level. None of the companies had ever implemented any of the technologies in any of 
their products. Thus none of the technologies had ever reached a positive ROI prior to the sale 
of the technology. Table 8 summarizes the key data on the four technologies that were sold 
through the successful transactions.   
4.3.2.3  Organization of Transactions 
As a starting point the transaction needed to be initiated. The two transactions by the MNC 
were initiated by employees related to the patent department, respectively the head of the pat-
ent department at ComC and at ComD by the licensing committee. At ComA the CEO initiated 
the transaction while at ComB an external party initiated the exploitation project.  
Three companies initiated the exploitation project driven by the motive that the company had 
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ever, with the business model being focused on the implementation of patenting strategies 
initiated the exploitation project with the motive to generate revenues from the technology. The 
resources required for completing the transaction varied between seven men days (ComB) and 
14 (ComA) men days. However, three of the four companies needed more than ten men days to 
complete the transaction. With a little more than two working weeks, both MNCs required 
almost similar resources to complete the transaction.  
 
Company  name  ComA ComB ComC ComD 
Initiator of the 




Motive for the 
project 
Strategic decision not 




Strategic decision not 
to develop the tech-
nology further 
Strategic decision 
not to develop the 
technology further 
Necessary 
resources (men - 
days) 
14 7  12 11 
… for planning 
stage  10 5  10 5 
… for negotia-
tion stage  1 1 0 3 
… for realisation 
stage  3 1 2 3 
Monetary re-
source need  10.000 € - 50.000 €  > 100.000 €  10.000 € - 50.000 €  10.000 € - 50.000 
€ 
Main cost driver 
Provision fee to 
auction company, 
registration fee 
Auction fees, legal 
costs for law suit, 
interest fees 
Salaries, auction fees  Necessary time  
Exploitation 
prior to auction 
Internally, with 
support of another 
TMI 
Internally, with 
patent attorney, with 






The buyer  Unknown  Unknown  Unknown (probably 






None (although the 
company was willing 
to) 
None None 
Table 9 : Summary of key facts for organization process of the four transactions 
Looking closer at the distribution of this workload across the three process stages, it became 
obvious that all companies had spent the major share of resources on the first, the planning 
stage. In average, the companies spent 2/3 of the resources for this stage. 20% of the resources 
were spending in average on the final stage, the realisation stage, while only a little more than 
10% of the resources were spend on the negotiation stage. Only at ComD, the distribution 
varied slightly different. The company had spent almost 50% of the resources on the planning 
stage. The remaining 50% were distributed almost equally on the following two stages.  
With regard to the monetary resources spent for completing the transaction, three of the com-
panies had expenses in the range between 10,000 € and 50,000 €. Only ComB had considerably 
higher costs for the transaction of about 100,000 €. The company explained these high costs 
with the proportional auction fee ratio on the sales price. Additionally, the company had to 
cover legal costs associated with a law suit prior to the auction.  © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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As major costs driver of the transaction, three of the companies identified the proportional 
success fees claimed by the auction company. Besides, for the two MNC internal salaries were 
substantial costs in the process to exploit the technology via the auction.  
Prior to the auction, all companies had already tried to exploit the IP assets through other ways. 
Both SMEs had tried to commercialize the technologies with the help of another TMI, respec-
tively a patent law firm, while ComB had even tried to exploit the technology in an own com-
pany as a spin-off. Both MNCs had tried to exploit the technologies using solely internal re-
sources.  
The buyers of the IP assets remained anonymously after the transactions, thus are unknown to 
the sellers, although ComC suspects that the buyer might be a ‘patent troll’. Thus none of the 
companies had delivered any additional knowledge after the auction to the buyers. Two com-
panies were even not willing to do so, to not spend any more resources on an IP asset they 
wanted to sell anyway.  
4.3.2.4  Perceived Success of the Transactions 
As major advantages of the auction compared to ‚traditional’ bilateral exploitation projects two 
companies identified the standardized contracts, the transparent process and the fixed fees. 
Furthermore, two companies valued that auctions can be used to exploit even technologies with 
low or moderate values, due to the relatively low costs as well as the accelerated transaction 
time.  
Compared to bilateral exploitation projects, throughout these auctions the auction company 
took over certain activities and provided support and expertise. All companies identified the 
provision of a standardized legal framework for the transactions as particular advantageous as 
well as the support for closing the contracts. Three companies valued the support of the auction 
company for the identification of buyers as well as for marketing the technologies in other 
businesses and partly in other counties as particular advantageous (ComC valued this a bit 
lower). Two companies furthermore raised the advantage that the auction company supported 
the transaction for the selection of the technologies, the information exchange between the 
sellers and the buyers and for controlling the process. 
As particular disadvantageous the two MNCs had identified the missing possibility to exclude 
certain buyers from the auction, while both SMEs identified the high total costs for the transac-
tion as major problems. The costs for the transactions were not problematic however for both 
MNCs. For ComA additionally the disclosure of sensitive company data was problematic too. 
Regarding the overall satisfaction with the transaction, three companies were totally satisfied 
with the duration of the transaction. ComC and ComB additionally were particularly satisfied 
with the overall sales price. ComB was additionally satisfied with the ease of the transaction 
and the sales price compared to the development costs. ComD and ComB were totally satisfied 
with the transaction in general. Only ComC and ComB delivered suggestions for further im-© Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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provements of the auction process. ComC would like to see more expertise of the auction com-
pany in the future as well as more operational freedom for the seller in the auction process. 
Furthermore, ComC recommended to make use of additional expertise of specialized patent 
law firms throughout the auction. ComB suggested to include information on the litigation 
status of the patents in the marketing material (e.g. catalogue)  
 
Company 
name  ComA ComB  ComC  ComD 
Transaction 









Total transaction costs 
Missing possibility 
to exclude certain 
buyers 
Missing possibility 





gies with low or 
moderate values; 
high sales price; 
no need for own 
expertise 
Standardized contracts; 





Possibility to exploit 
technologies with 







ogy valuation  
 






provision of a 
standardized legal 
framework 
Selection of the technol-
ogy; marketing in other 
businesses and other 
countries in general; 
identification of buyers; 
support the information 
exchange between buyer 
and seller; general proc-
ess control; contract 




Selection of the 
technology; market-
ing in other busi-
nesses; identification 
of buyers; contract 
closing; provision of 
a standardized legal 
framework 
Marketing in other 
businesses and in 
general; identifica-












Sales price;  
Price compared to devel-
opment costs; 
Ease of transaction;  
Duration of transaction; 
In general 
 





improvements  - 
To include infringement 






freedom for seller; 




Table 10 : Summary of success data for four transactions 
To summarize, having analyzed four successfully exploited IP assets based on completed ques-
tionnaires from project managers representing the seller side we presented background infor-
mation on the buyer and the exploited technology. Then we analyzed the organization of the 
transaction process, the perception of the companies regarding advantages and disadvantages 
of an auction to exploit a technology in comparison to bilateral exploitation project. Finally, we © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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presented insights into the perception of the companies regarding the role of the auction com-
panies supporting the transaction as a third party and assessed the success of the transactions as 
well as we asked for recommendations to improve IP auctions in the future. 
  
5  Conclusions 
Throughout this paper we have attempted to generate a first understanding addressing the over-
arching research question of whether and how new models currently offered by TMIs can actu-
ally facilitate ETE. To address this question, in a first step we have tried to gain insights into 
TMIs acting on the markets for technology. Throughout the first part of the paper we provided 
some new evidence on the growing number of TMIs and derived a conceptual basis for a fur-
ther understanding of TMIs. Having carried out a detailed review of the literature, reflecting on 
our first insights into the new models offered by TMIs, we saw that TMIs significantly change 
the direct seller and buyer relationship as common in ‘traditional’ ETE transaction towards 
rather indirect relationships. In their function of linking buyers and sellers supporting ETE 
transactions, based on empirical data applying the ‘nine business model building blocks’ from 
Osterwalder (2004) we were able to identify 12 different types of TMIs which we then consoli-
dated into six TMI archetypes using the framework for ‘business models archetypes’ of 
Herman and Malone (2003). Throughout this exercise we were able to gain insights into the 
variety of different functions TMIs have on the markets for technology and various new ways 
how TMIs try to facilitate ETE transactions.  
Throughout the second part of this paper, we focused on IP auctions as one particular business 
model of the archetype ‘IP Broker’ to which our attention was drawn throughout several inter-
views with industry experts, who believed in IP auctions as a promising business model. Fur-
thermore, from a variety of sources sufficient data was available to investigate this ‘young’ 
business model throughout an academic study. Although in this first paper we presented only 
parts of a full analysis that will be available in Tietze (2009 (forthcoming)). So far we were 
able to present first insights into two qualitative studies leaving aside a full quantitative analy-
sis of traded patents via IP auctions. In a first step we derived a generic IP auction process 
based on a qualitative, empirical analysis of IP auction processes. The results from this analysis 
were then translated into a process view using the ETE process model by Lichtenthaler (2006) 
to derive a generic IP auction process as a specific type of an ETE process. Having thus gener-
ated a close understanding of the transaction process, we presented results from four cases of 
successful transactions, i.e. where patents were sold for particular high prices from two SMEs 
and two MNCs.  
Throughout this exercise, aside from the mere descriptive analysis of the transactions, we 
gained first insights into the question of whether IP auctions can actually becomes a sustainable 
model for ETE. Throughout the questionnaire, addressed to the sellers of the patents, we inves-
tigated the sellers’ perception of advantages of IP auctions over rather ‘traditional’ bilateral © Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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ETE transactions. We wanted to understand which of the existing obstacles for efficient ETE 
transactions are reduced by this new model. Additionally, we investigated the perceived disad-
vantages of IP auctions.  
From this approach, we learned that three of the four companies were generally satisfied with 
the outcome of the transaction and the process as such. As well companies that had little inter-
nal resources and expertise in the ETE area, were able to exploit their technologies via an auc-
tion in a relatively comfortable way. Three of the four companies were overall satisfied with 
the transaction, however it seems as the companies focus on different issues throughout the 
transactions. While the SMEs would prefer to run the auctions for lower costs, the two MNCs 
have a more strategic approach and would like to exclude certain buyers from the auction. One 
company however was not satisfied with the auction. Accordingly the organization of the auc-
tion should become more professionally in the future. The sales price which the company 
reached was too low compared to the development costs and patent fee the company had al-
ready spent for the technology. 
Throughout the four cases, we identified certain aspects that the companies perceived as par-
ticular advantageous, respectively disadvantageous compared to bilateral exploitation projects. 
As particular advantageous the companies valued the marketing support of the auction compa-
nies for their technologies in other businesses than their own businesses. Furthermore, the 
companies valued the support to identify buyers and the short duration of the transactions. 
Additionally, the provision of a standardized legal framework, standardized contracts and fees 
by the auction company was perceived to be advantageous. Thus, we can conclude that the 
auction model offers companies a relatively easy, quick and cost efficient way to exploit tech-
nologies.  
However, we came across various drawbacks of the auction model for exploiting technologies. 
As particular disadvantageous the companies experienced the missing possibility to exclude 
certain buyers from the auction as well as high total costs, particularly for high sales prices. 
The financial issues however, were perceived to be more negative by the SMEs, while MNCs 
rather focussed on the strategic issues. Compared to bilateral exploitation projects, the compa-
nies have less operational freedom throughout the auction process. They are e.g. limited in the 
choice of material they want to provide to potential buyers. However, auctions, due to their 
standardized process, lead to shorter transaction times and might even reach higher sales prices 
due to the competitive pressure when several interested buyers are present at the auction.  
Prior to the auctions, all companies tried to exploit the technologies already with internal re-
sources only. The SMEs had already tried to use other TMIs or patent law firms for an exploi-
tation or to spin-off an own company dedicated to one particular technology. Thus, we can 
conclude that for these particular technologies the auction model appeared to be the most 
promising. However, the technology that is to be commercialized via an auction should still 
have a certain value because fixed auction fees (e.g. registration fees) will always have to be 
covered. On the contrary, one has to be aware that for particular high sales prices, the provi-© Frank Tietze, 2008                             Technology Markt Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation 
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sional fees can be substantial so that a bilateral exploitation project with its usually high costs 
might pay off alternatively. Thus, in general companies willing to exploit a technology will 
have to make a trade off between the short transaction time, little need for own expertise and 
cost savings for marketing the technology with the eventually high fees for the auction com-
pany, especially for particularly high valued technologies.  
To conclude, it appears to us that IP auctions actually have a potential to become a sustainable 
model for ETE transactions as an alternative to rather traditional bilateral ETE, particularly 
because the auction model reduces certain obstacles in the exploitation process that make bilat-
eral transactions often burdensome. However, auctions certainly will not be suitable for ex-
ploiting all IP assets, respectively patents to a similar extent. As long as sellers cannot exclude 
certain buyers from any IP auction sellers will be reluctant to exploit patents that are of particu-
lar importance to the company and should not be bought by certain buyers, e.g. direct competi-
tors. Thus one could hypothesis that companies will not prefer the auction model for these 
particularly valuable assets. A more complete picture of this discussion will be available in 
Tietze (2009 (forthcoming)) when more detailed insights are available on the traded assets 
particularly. Furthermore, the results of these four cases should be taken carefully due to the 
limited number of observation points. Further research is needed to better understand specifi-
cally under which circumstances, respectively for which particular assets IP auctions can be a 
preferred ETE model. This question will be discussed in more detail and further addressed by a 
large quantitative analysis in (Tietze, 2009). 
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